it's the same story with all of these analytics people. when a player their model likes signs a contract they have to find
some issue with it so they can keep up this 'smartest person in the room' schtick.
with severson, the models universally agree that he's really good, so all of they zero in on the term as a big problem. the irony is that these analytics personalities don't take the five seconds to
analyze the contract structure or look for examples of how much it costs to trade players near the end of similar contracts (i.e. voracek).
the obvious outcomes to giving severson an 8-year deal are:
- he plays out the whole thing (best outcome)
- they trade him
- they buy out the last 1-2 years of his deal (arguably worst outcome)
for #2, if he's still a fairly effective player, the cost to move him could be minimal. if they're in a cap crunch and need to move him for cap space, they would likely incur a small additional cost. some comparables for that:
- voracek's (1 year, $8.25m) to arizona cost a 6th round pick
- pacioretty (1 year, $7m) to carolina cost a third pair defenseman (coghlan)
- walker (1 year, $2.6m) + petersen (2 years, $5m) to PHI cost the kings a 2nd round pick + helge grans
or they could do something similar to the atkinson trade (taking on a bigger cap hit with less term left) if he's still a fairly effective player. there are plenty of options to get him off the books without a buyout – and the jackets would still get surplus value out of acquiring severson because it only cost a third rounder to get him.
even in a buyout situation, if they treat the contract like a six-year deal, the total acquisition cost becomes:
CBJ gets | CBJ gives up |
Six years of Damon Severson (age 29-34 seasons) | 2023 3rd round pick
$2.85m cap hit in 29-30
$2.85m cap hit in 30-31
$1.70m cap hit in 31-32
$1.70m cap hit in 32-33 |
the cost of that cap space, in trade terms, would be something like an additional third rounder. so they'd be getting six years of severson for a 2023 3rd + the cost equivalent of a 2030 3rd, which is still massive surplus value for columbus.
in other words – even if they have to pay a small asset cost (or take on small buyout cap hits in the 2030s) to get him off the books, they're still getting massive surplus value when you add that to the initial acquisition cost. it's like they're paying for him in two installments: one now, one in 2030.
it's a move that analytics people would be universally lauding if they actually took a few minutes to analyze rather than simply reacting to the term number.