Confirmed with Link: Oilers Do Not Match Broberg ($4.58M X2) & Holloway ($2.29M x 2) Offer Sheets | Oilers acquire STL 3rd '28 & Paul Fischer for Futures

[Tobias Kahun]

The bull market was a record $1 billion spend on day 1 of free agency. With a huge cash influx and projections for every year to follow the market conditions were evolved beyond covid flat cap and the spending affirmed it.

Making comparisons to Holloway are pointless. There's no trade market for a small Nick Robertson let alone an RFA one for a secondary winger. Not the type of player you waste your RFA bullets on. Holloway was a means to an end with a historic double offer sheet by one team. Well articulated by Armstrong across multiple reporting sources.

The poacher was known to Oilers management. The players discussed over the past two trade deadlines. The Oilers were vulnerable and had a damaged relationship with Broberg. Even Holloway viewed his development and opportunity path differently than the team did.

Harley, Seider are elite prospects who are proven elite young talent going to garner a next tier RFA offer sheet to even have a sniff at poaching them. Detroit able to protect itself with tons of cap space is acting pro-actively to ward off even a remote consideration. This historic precedent worked because of the double RFA threat, cap exposure, and big future contracts pending on core franchise guys. Edmonton's management group missed the danger signs which enabled the market to set the pricing on two young NHL ready players only now aging into peak years performance range. Leveraged offer sheets nestled right below at the cheapest return available.

Bowman's own mature phase window experience he actually had direct experience with offer sheeting and having to make a hard call when the market acted to set pricing. He's been there so it's reasonable to plan to mitigate such a double indemnity threat.

It’s a lot easier to hoard cap space to fight off offer sheets when your team isn’t very good.

The oilers are trying to win a cup, broberg and Holloway and an outlier in terms of offer sheets.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

The patterns for times when the cap rises have been consistent throughout the cap years. The top dogs and key RFA's get big raises and it then trickles down. Every time this happens RFA's coming off ECL's and aging vets get squeezed. And with the exception of Holloway and Broberg, this is the pattern we are seeing right now. Until we see a change in behaviour that shows things are really different this looks like an anomaly.

Offer sheets are rare because they are inflationary, inefficient in likely to be matched when all things are considered. The cost usually begins with tiers that begin with a 1st round pick so that makes the consequences much more significant. It's seldom used but doesn't stop teams like a Detroit situation from mitigating against its double threat by keeping open cap room. Different phase in their development so more able to do so.

I highly doubt the behaviour will change to more offer sheets. There's a hard lesson learned through the Oilers situation losing its two young players, so, teams take notice and will likely be prepared ... until someone else falls asleep again. Now, where the market may change is more movement as we're seeing of young players asserting themselves to move from a team to new homes elsewhere - whether the college loophole (Winnipeg); Tkatchuk not re-signinging (Calgary); Askarov opportunity trade request (Nashville). This critical age group under team control is increasingly using all available levers to move on from organizations. That's a bigger trend to watch. GM Trotz spoke about this modern generation's young players being different in their patience and tolerance levels to choose and control their destiny.

It’s a lot easier to hoard cap space to fight off offer sheets when your team isn’t very good.

The oilers are trying to win a cup, broberg and Holloway and an outlier in terms of offer sheets.

Said that already in my posts. It's why Detroit isn't vulnerable even as they've planned for it with a GM known to play contract hardball. Edmonton missed or ignored all the signs of their vulnerability and got burned.

 

[Fourier]

Offer sheets are rare because they are inflationary, inefficient in likely to be matched when all things are considered. The cost usually begins with tiers that begin with a 1st round pick so that makes the consequences much more significant. It's seldom used but doesn't stop teams like a Detroit situation from mitigating against its double threat by keeping open cap room. Different phase in their development so more able to do so.

I highly doubt the behaviour will change to more offer sheets. There's a hard lesson learned through the Oilers situation losing its two young players, so, teams take notice and will likely be prepared ... until someone else falls asleep again. Now, where the market may change is more movement as we're seeing of young players asserting themselves to move from a team to new homes elsewhere - whether the college loophole (Winnipeg); Tkatchuk not re-signinging (Calgary); Askarov opportunity trade request (Nashville). This critical age group under team control is increasingly using all available levers to move on from organizations. That's a bigger trend to walk. GM Trotz spoke about this modern generation's young players being different in their patience and tolerance levels to choose and control their destiny.


Said that already in my posts. It's why Detroit isn't vulnerable even as they've planned for it with a GM known to play contract hardball. Edmonton missed or ignored all the signs of their vulnerability and got burned.

You still have no given me no compelling argument that the Oilers fell asleep any more than any team would. After Broberg and Holloway signed their OS was there some big rush to sign guys to bigger deals or even at all? I don't see it. Teams went on doing exactly what they always do.

Again, getting burned assumes that there was another action that could have prevented this. I really don't buy the "if they were nicer to me I would have stayed" narrative. It seems that both players were given offers near the upper end of what they Oilers were prepared to offer. The players had a right to seek other offers and effectively to price themselves off the team. My sense is that the team would have done very little different even in hindsight, nor as someone who has followed this stuff for years would I have expected them to do so.

Had the Oilers gone much higher they may well have kept Holloway but at a price. It would have meant going with a shorter roster. If Holloway regressed at all or stagnated then next year or the year after there is a decent chance he does not get a QO and they lose him for nothing. Similarly for Broberg but even more so. Look a ta guy like Brannstrom. He was viewed as a key piece in the Stone trade. Even on the Sens his $2M QO was not deemed to be worth it so they lost him as a UFA.

 

[Tobias Kahun]

Offer sheets are rare because they are inflationary, inefficient in likely to be matched when all things are considered. The cost usually begins with tiers that begin with a 1st round pick so that makes the consequences much more significant. It's seldom used but doesn't stop teams like a Detroit situation from mitigating against its double threat by keeping open cap room. Different phase in their development so more able to do so.

I highly doubt the behaviour will change to more offer sheets. There's a hard lesson learned through the Oilers situation losing its two young players, so, teams take notice and will likely be prepared ... until someone else falls asleep again. Now, where the market may change is more movement as we're seeing of young players asserting themselves to move from a team to new homes elsewhere - whether the college loophole (Winnipeg); Tkatchuk not re-signinging (Calgary); Askarov opportunity trade request (Nashville). This critical age group under team control is increasingly using all available levers to move on from organizations. That's a bigger trend to watch. GM Trotz spoke about this modern generation's young players being different in their patience and tolerance levels to choose and control their destiny.


Said that already in my posts. It's why Detroit isn't vulnerable even as they've planned for it with a GM known to play contract hardball. Edmonton missed or ignored all the signs of their vulnerability and got burned.

So you’re suggesting that the oilers should’ve not signed anyone on free agency to leave enough cap space to sign these 2 prospects rather than make the team better on July 1st?

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

You still have no given me no compelling argument that the Oilers fell asleep any more than any team would. After Broberg and Holloway signed their OS was there some big rush to sign guys to bigger deals or even at all? I don't see it. Teams went on doing exactly what they always do.

Again, getting burned assumes that there was another action that could have prevented this. I really don't buy the "if they were nicer to me I would have stayed" narrative. It seems that both players were given offers near the upper end of what they Oilers were prepared to offer. The players had a right to seek other offers and effectively to price themselves off the team. My sense is that the team would have done very little different even in hindsight, nor as someone who has followed this stuff for years would I have expected them to do so.

Had the Oilers gone much higher they may well have kept Holloway but at a price. It would have meant going with a shorter roster. If Holloway regressed at all or stagnated then next year or the year after there is a decent chance he does not get a QO and they lose him for nothing. Similarly for Broberg but even more so. Look a ta guy like Brannstrom. He was viewed as a key piece in the Stone trade. Even on the Sens his $2M QO was not deemed to be worth it so they lost him as a UFA.

The Oilers weren't any team. They had very specific vulnerabilities with their late stage organization, spending over cap on day 1 free agency, a disgruntled player who asked for a trade in-season along with a second pedigree young RFA. Both of whom showed well in final four Cup competition. And big contracts for super elites on the horizon. It's why there were allegedly 3 prospective offer sheets on Broberg and why the double offer sheets were able to come in a low level of CBA return.

We know the inaction choice led to mid-August offer sheets that worked because of the specific vulnerabilities the Oilers felt were low risk. Other approaches could have mitigated the consequences - get one RFA signed early to fend off risk of double indemnity; proactively make your best budget offer early and gage situation with a disgruntled player and second guy. If no traction initiate trade discussions to control the situation and manage return for your organization's best young NHL ready talent. Even act like they did with McLeod signing in early August and maybe you've got a chance to mitigate your obvious exposure. If the player asks are $1.3 million Holloway and $1.5 million Broberg, this is manageable money and cap wise. If they don't take the offer it's clear they aren't affordable within the cap and budget plan, so move to shop them. Having showcased their upside in deep playoff conditions, it's reasonable to think there would be a trade market which is at worst case scenario worth knowing as part of your negotiations with your two young NHL ready best talents.

There's risk in all young players but also upside. It was a targeted bet by St. Louis with low risk of assets and a walkaway after 1 year at pennies on the dollar if one or both fail. Now if as you cite the Brannstrom situation If there was a trade return of a 1st round prospect and a 1st round pick or variation of pedigree talent return (like McLeod), then that's a viable hedge versus being painted into a corner as happened with their choice to passively slow play and hope. Stranger yet when Bowman himself saw an offer sheet situation in managing a championship level team in similar situation.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

So you’re suggesting that the oilers should’ve not signed anyone on free agency to leave enough cap space to sign these 2 prospects rather than make the team better on July 1st?

Have never ever suggested that. Fully onboard and highly praised their managements work through the draft and free agency. Bullish on the pro-active McLeod trade where they moved a secondary piece for a quality, pedigree return to shave cap and create a quality piece within a poor prospect pipeline.

Knowing the strategy is all-in July 1 veteran signings, resulting cap vulnerability, broken Broberg relationship and Kane unknown, I believe they could have been pro-active with negotiations on Broberg and Holloway. Active discussions after big free agent push was done. Move to your best offer and assess if they sign or don't. Have a hard line in the sand with your budget reality for the players (assume the Oilers have multi-year budgeting planning) and if one or both young players don't sign, move to the trade front which would also be an offer sheet mitigation strategy to bluff GM's of intent to match any prospective offers. Good due diligence planning with the significant vulnerabilities they had.

Not sure why someone would think it's a binary either or scenario. Risk management to cover all the bases with clarity on your line in the sand on quality secondary team assets. Just like McLeod was signed above expected market value early August last year and moved out this year for a real good pedigree asset that's near NHL ready.

 

[Reasonable Oil Fan]

seems strange,

So you’re suggesting that the oilers should’ve not signed anyone on free agency to leave enough cap space to sign these 2 prospects rather than make the team better on July 1st?

Its a tricky spot
Our window is right now for the next 4 or 5 years, we have to go for it.
However, even though I like what they did this summer, we will have to find a way to "go for it" and replenish our prospects a little so that we arent totally screwed once this window starts to close. We need to start doing that in tandem with a cup run team starting the year after next at the latest.

 

[Tobias Kahun]

Have never ever suggested that. Fully onboard and highly praised their managements work through the draft and free agency. Bullish on the pro-active McLeod trade where they moved a secondary piece for a quality, pedigree return to shave cap and create a quality piece within a poor prospect pipeline.

Knowing the strategy is all-in July 1 veteran signings, resulting cap vulnerability, broken Broberg relationship and Kane unknown, I believe they could have been pro-active with negotiations on Broberg and Holloway. Active discussions after big free agent push was done. Move to your best offer and assess if they sign or don't. Have a hard line in the sand with your budget reality for the players (assume the Oilers have multi-year budgeting planning) and if one or both young players don't sign, move to the trade front which would also be an offer sheet mitigation strategy to bluff GM's of intent to match any prospective offers. Good due diligence planning with the significant vulnerabilities they had.

Not sure why someone would think it's a binary either or scenario. Risk management to cover all the bases with clarity on your line in the sand on quality secondary team assets. Just like McLeod was signed above expected market value early August last year and moved out this year for a real good pedigree asset that's near NHL ready.

Not really sure a threat of trading them would’ve been a bluff, considering once the offer sheet is signed you can’t trade them

 

[Oilslick941611]

If they signed them to half these contracts, people might balk, but if Stan Bowman came out and said: “They had gigantic offer sheets tabled by rival teams taking a run at them. We had to compromise to keep them” , they would instantly be forgiven. Because ultimately, they’re easily, easily, EASILY worth half what they’re getting paid. Potential is still majorly on the table, and they’re effective right now.

No, no they aren’t.

Broberg MIGHT be in a few years. He’s played 10 decent games and quite frankly ranked last out of 6 dmen on the team in statistics. He needs prove he can play a full season and be better than Ceci while doing it. he has shown that isn’t capable of it more than he has shown that he can. easy pass.

Holloway is a player who will be injured a lot based on the way he plays and wont play above the 3rd line with us.

The bull market was a record $1 billion spend on day 1 of free agency. With a huge cash influx and projections for every year to follow the market conditions were evolved beyond covid flat cap and the spending affirmed it.

Making comparisons to Holloway are pointless. There's no trade market for a small Nick Robertson let alone an RFA one for a secondary winger. Not the type of player you waste your RFA bullets on. Holloway was a means to an end with a historic double offer sheet by one team. Well articulated by Armstrong across multiple reporting sources.

The poacher was known to Oilers management. The players discussed over the past two trade deadlines. The Oilers were vulnerable and had a damaged relationship with Broberg. Even Holloway viewed his development and opportunity path differently than the team did.

Harley, Seider are elite prospects who are proven elite young talent going to garner a next tier RFA offer sheet to even have a sniff at poaching them. Detroit able to protect itself with tons of cap space is acting pro-actively to ward off even a remote consideration. This historic precedent worked because of the double RFA threat, cap exposure, and big future contracts pending on core franchise guys. Edmonton's management group missed the danger signs which enabled the market to set the pricing on two young NHL ready players only now aging into peak years performance range. Leveraged offer sheets nestled right below at the cheapest return available.

Bowman's own mature phase window experience he actually had direct experience with offer sheeting and having to make a hard call when the market acted to set pricing. He's been there so it's reasonable to plan to mitigate such a double indemnity threat.

You are just looking for a reason to hate on management. You are the one misreading the situation. UFAs signing big deals doesnt equal the RFA market.

 

[Bryanbryoil]

Offer sheets are rare because they are inflationary, inefficient in likely to be matched when all things are considered. The cost usually begins with tiers that begin with a 1st round pick so that makes the consequences much more significant. It's seldom used but doesn't stop teams like a Detroit situation from mitigating against its double threat by keeping open cap room. Different phase in their development so more able to do so.

I highly doubt the behaviour will change to more offer sheets. There's a hard lesson learned through the Oilers situation losing its two young players, so, teams take notice and will likely be prepared ... until someone else falls asleep again. Now, where the market may change is more movement as we're seeing of young players asserting themselves to move from a team to new homes elsewhere - whether the college loophole (Winnipeg); Tkatchuk not re-signinging (Calgary); Askarov opportunity trade request (Nashville). This critical age group under team control is increasingly using all available levers to move on from organizations. That's a bigger trend to watch. GM Trotz spoke about this modern generation's young players being different in their patience and tolerance levels to choose and control their destiny.


Said that already in my posts. It's why Detroit isn't vulnerable even as they've planned for it with a GM known to play contract hardball. Edmonton missed or ignored all the signs of their vulnerability and got burned.

1) Since when is Detroit a contender?

2) Since when do they have 3 guys like Connor, Leon and Bouchard to worry about locking up within 2 years while also having a depth guy eating $9.25 million? They have to lock up Seider and are making sure to have space for him, that's no different than us making sure that we have space for Bouchard. Who else there is really worth close to $10 million + AAV?

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

Not really sure a threat of trading them would’ve been a bluff, considering once the offer sheet is signed you can’t trade them

The offer sheets were signed mid-August. They traded McLeod shortly after the big league spending flurry of July 1. All of July and early August to assess the ability to sign them at your budget threshold or explore trade options. Again, have a clear understanding of your budget threshold for the two young players (as they would with all on a cap threshold team) and move in negotiations earlier to seek resolution - either re-signing is possible or it is not. Move on from the players and manage the assets for return.

 

[SupremeTeam16]

You still have no given me no compelling argument that the Oilers fell asleep any more than any team would. After Broberg and Holloway signed their OS was there some big rush to sign guys to bigger deals or even at all? I don't see it. Teams went on doing exactly what they always do.

Again, getting burned assumes that there was another action that could have prevented this. I really don't buy the "if they were nicer to me I would have stayed" narrative. It seems that both players were given offers near the upper end of what they Oilers were prepared to offer. The players had a right to seek other offers and effectively to price themselves off the team. My sense is that the team would have done very little different even in hindsight, nor as someone who has followed this stuff for years would I have expected them to do so.

Had the Oilers gone much higher they may well have kept Holloway but at a price. It would have meant going with a shorter roster. If Holloway regressed at all or stagnated then next year or the year after there is a decent chance he does not get a QO and they lose him for nothing. Similarly for Broberg but even more so. Look a ta guy like Brannstrom. He was viewed as a key piece in the Stone trade. Even on the Sens his $2M QO was not deemed to be worth it so they lost him as a UFA.

I think the only mistake the Oilers possibly made was not putting it out there that both these players were on the block and fully exploring the trade market but the flip side of that coin is that you aren’t going to trade them before the trade deadline when their value was likely at its lowest point and probably not much more then what they ended up with, so then you’re stuck trying to move them at the draft a few days after your season just came to an end. But the truth is you’ve spent time developing these player and you need them to be inexpensive depth moving forward so at the end of the day you really don’t want to deal these guys.

The part of the story that we don’t have that really is key for me is the convos between the Oilers and Darren Ferris, who is a known greaseball. My guess is Ferris knew that the Oilers wouldn’t be in a hurry to honour a trade requests from his client so an offer sheet became their course of action, especially when an NHL GM who has a need at LD just happens to coincidentally announce he’d look at offersheeting other teams rfa’s.

We know Ferris isn’t above greasy tactics and the fact that Bowman came out with his comments about no hard feelings with Armstrong but makes absolutely zero mention of the player agent tells me that the Oilers might not have been happy with how Ferris went about things. Without knowing exactly the conversations that were had, my opinion is that Broberg had no intention of signing with the Oilers until July 1 and once he had that offer sheet which I’m sure even though it was signed in mid August was likely presented to the agent in the early days of July, once they knew they had that offer there was no way they were ever going to sign anything the Oilers put in front of them, even if the Oilers went way over market comparables. But I think Ferris priority was ensuring Broberg got out of Edmonton so it behooved him to mislead the team on how salvageable the relationship was and as well to drag negotiations out in order to put the Oilers in the worse position possible thus increasing the odds they wouldn’t match.

 

[Tobias Kahun]

The offer sheets were signed mid-August. They traded McLeod shortly after the big league spending flurry of July 1. All of July and early August to assess the ability to sign them at your budget threshold or explore trade options. Again, have a clear understanding of your budget threshold for the two young players (as they would with all on a cap threshold team) and move in negotiations earlier to seek resolution - either re-signing is possible or it is not. Move on from the players and manage the assets for return.

That’s not how it works, GMs often negotiate for a long time, they don’t just have a final number on a RFA and trade them quickly.

I don’t think the Oilers should’ve prepared for them getting offer sheets at 2-3x their value.

 

[Oilslick941611]

1) Since when is Detroit a contender?

2) Since when do they have 3 guys like Connor, Leon and Bouchard to worry about locking up within 2 years while also having a depth guy eating $9.25 million? They have to lock up Seider and are making sure to have space for him, that's no different than us making sure that we have space for Bouchard. Who else there is really worth close to $10 million + AAV?

They are comparing apples to space rockets. The situations the teams are in are in no way similar and can’t be managed the same way.

Our situation is partly because of the contender curve and partly because we haven’t stable management and have been hopping Gms and coaches every 1.5 years on average and the new GM needs to spend time fixing the old GMs mistakes. Holland did well for himself despite his issues. He put our team on the right track and the nurse contract is the real only issue he leaves behind. He did really well cleaning up after Chia. Detroit has been bad for years and haven’t signed any major UFA’s in forever and let their good but old/expensive players go elsewhere which is good for cap space and horrible for icing a competitive team.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

No, no they aren’t.

Broberg MIGHT be in a few years. He’s played 10 decent games and quite frankly ranked last out of 6 dmen on the team in statistics. He needs prove he can play a full season and be better than Ceci while doing it. he has shown that isn’t capable of it more than he has shown that he can. easy pass.

Holloway is a player who will be injured a lot based on the way he plays and wont play above the 3rd line with us.


You are just looking for a reason to hate on management. You are the one misreading the situation. UFAs signing big deals doesnt equal the RFA market.

Funny thing to say. I'm very bullish on the management group. Loved the Jackson hire, supported Coffey's hiring decision when alot didn't. Highly praised their draft decision to get into the 1st round. Loved and praised their free agency work. Thought they did excellent work with the McLeod trade to shave cap and add a top prospect to their poor pool.

It's really okay not to love every decision a team makes. This was a historic, precedent setting offer sheet scenario in which their two top NHL ready young talents were lost for marginal return. Fair and reasonable to wonder how this could happen. Especially in light of the relationship with Broberg and vulnerabilities within their winning window.

I've also posted they will actually have an opportunity moving forward to find a better fit right-shooting veteran d-man to cover off a huge hole I've railed about for years. I do believe this management group is better situated to do so with their modern approach as an information based organization.

 

[jukon]

Will this be the 'spy on the kids and be secretly happy if they struggle' thread?

 

[Stauf4Prez]

Will this be the 'spy on the kids and be secretly happy if they struggle' thread?

I mean, if the shoe fits lol.

 

[K1984]

I think the only mistake the Oilers possibly made was not putting it out there that both these players were on the block and fully exploring the trade market but the flip side of that coin is that you aren’t going to trade them before the trade deadline when their value was likely at its lowest point and probably not much more then what they ended up with, so then you’re stuck trying to move them at the draft a few days after your season just came to an end. But the truth is you’ve spent time developing these player and you need them to be inexpensive depth moving forward so at the end of the day you really don’t want to deal these guys.

The part of the story that we don’t have that really is key for me is the convos between the Oilers and Darren Ferris, who is a known greaseball. My guess is Ferris knew that the Oilers wouldn’t be in a hurry to honour a trade requests from his client so an offer sheet became their course of action, especially when an NHL GM who has a need at LD just happens to coincidentally announce he’d look at offersheeting other teams rfa’s.

We know Ferris isn’t above greasy tactics and the fact that Bowman came out with his comments about no hard feelings with Armstrong but makes absolutely zero mention of the player agent tells me that the Oilers might not have been happy with how Ferris went about things. Without knowing exactly the conversations that were had, my opinion is that Broberg had no intention of signing with the Oilers until July 1 and once he had that offer sheet which I’m sure even though it was signed in mid August was likely presented to the agent in the early days of July, once they knew they had that offer there was no way they were ever going to sign anything the Oilers put in front of them, even if the Oilers went way over market comparables. But I think Ferris priority was ensuring Broberg got out of Edmonton so it behooved him to mislead the team on how salvageable the relationship was and as well to drag negotiations out in order to put the Oilers in the worse position possible thus increasing the odds they wouldn’t match.

This is the part of the equation that doesn't get recognized well enough. The market value for both at the deadline was probably a 2nd rounder at best. And that's if you feel like stripping depth before the playoffs.

Other alternative would have been moving them on July 1, but if they were already talking offer sheets at that point, then whatever team acquires them is going to be dealing with the same issue.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

That’s not how it works, GMs often negotiate for a long time, they don’t just have a final number on a RFA and trade them quickly.

I don’t think the Oilers should’ve prepared for them getting offer sheets at 2-3x their value.

They had ability to have pro-active negotiations with them. With active negotiation you can assess the relationship and likelihood of resigning 1, both, or neither player. You control the timing of your offers and amounts. They didn't do that and it was reported a first face to face happened at the Hlinka Tournament with what sounds like Bill Scott. Doesn't even have to be your executive leadership.

What I'm saying is if you approach with active negotiation and a sense of priority to get a deal done, then intent can be revealed. It informs your prospective decisions including a contingency that perhaps you have to move your best young assets.

Offer sheeting has to be part of your risk management planning. Especially with all of the vulnerabilities the Oilers faced. It's rare but a viable threat.

 

[Tobias Kahun]

They had ability to have pro-active negotiations with them. With active negotiation you can assess the relationship and likelihood of resigning 1, both, or neither player. You control the timing of your offers and amounts. They didn't do that and it was reported a first face to face happened at the Hlinka Tournament with what sounds like Bill Scott. Doesn't even have to be your executive leadership.

What I'm saying is if you approach with active negotiation and a sense of priority to get a deal done, then intent can be revealed. It informs your prospective decisions including a contingency that perhaps you have to move your best young assets.

Offer sheeting has to be part of your risk management planning. Especially with all of the vulnerabilities the Oilers faced. It's rare but a viable threat.

You’re still basing all your thoughts of how negotiations went from what the players agent said.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

1) Since when is Detroit a contender?

2) Since when do they have 3 guys like Connor, Leon and Bouchard to worry about locking up within 2 years while also having a depth guy eating $9.25 million? They have to lock up Seider and are making sure to have space for him, that's no different than us making sure that we have space for Bouchard. Who else there is really worth close to $10 million + AAV?

Didn't ever say Detroit was a contender. Just an example of a type of risk mitigation. If you prefer, choose Dallas who have over $6 million in cap space to mitigate an RFA run on Harley. Harley's more NHL proven so he's not getting signed at the Broberg tier. Much bigger return and lower likelihood.

When the Oilers know their reality is chasing a Cup and their budget is spoken for with veteran finishing pieces and a multi-year negotiations to secure three cornerstone elites, it's a hard reality to decide where the support players fit and at what prices (over years within budget planning). Just like they did pro-actively with McLeod for a great pedigree return.

 

[Tobias Kahun]

Funny thing to say. I'm very bullish on the management group. Loved the Jackson hire, supported Coffey's hiring decision when alot didn't. Highly praised their draft decision to get into the 1st round. Loved and praised their free agency work. Thought they did excellent work with the McLeod trade to shave cap and add a top prospect to their poor pool.

It's really okay not to love every decision a team makes. This was a historic, precedent setting offer sheet scenario in which their two top NHL ready young talents were lost for marginal return. Fair and reasonable to wonder how this could happen. Especially in light of the relationship with Broberg and vulnerabilities within their winning window.

I've also posted they will actually have an opportunity moving forward to find a better fit right-shooting veteran d-man to cover off a huge hole I've railed about for years. I do believe this management group is better situated to do so with their modern approach as an information based organization.

I like how in here you call it a historic, precedent setting move, yet also say the Oilers should’ve done a better job at managing it.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

You’re still basing all your thoughts of how negotiations went from what the players agent said.

It's the information available. There's no evidence the Oilers submitted more than initial offers or actively negotiated with the two young players. They made market comparable offers but nothing to indicate there was follow up, progressive discussions. We saw with last year's McLeod negotiation there was movement that led to a surprising (to me) over $2 million contract in early August.

“The way it’s being portrayed is also a little bit unfair, that the Oilers were doing some sort of poor-faith negotiating,” Bowman said. “If you look at both those players, based on their performance, there’s lots of comparable players that have signed this summer and recent years.”

 

[Fourier]

The Oilers weren't any team. They had very specific vulnerabilities with their late stage organization, spending over cap on day 1 free agency, a disgruntled player who asked for a trade in-season along with a second pedigree young RFA. Both of whom showed well in final four Cup competition. And big contracts for super elites on the horizon. It's why there were allegedly 3 prospective offer sheets on Broberg and why the double offer sheets were able to come in a low level of CBA return.

We know the inaction choice led to mid-August offer sheets that worked because of the specific vulnerabilities the Oilers felt were low risk. Other approaches could have mitigated the consequences - get one RFA signed early to fend off risk of double indemnity; proactively make your best budget offer early and gage situation with a disgruntled player and second guy. If no traction initiate trade discussions to control the situation and manage return for your organization's best young NHL ready talent. Even act like they did with McLeod signing in early August and maybe you've got a chance to mitigate your obvious exposure. If the player asks are $1.3 million Holloway and $1.5 million Broberg, this is manageable money and cap wise. If they don't take the offer it's clear they aren't affordable within the cap and budget plan, so move to shop them. Having showcased their upside in deep playoff conditions, it's reasonable to think there would be a trade market which is at worst case scenario worth knowing as part of your negotiations with your two young NHL ready best talents.

There's risk in all young players but also upside. It was a targeted bet by St. Louis with low risk of assets and a walkaway after 1 year at pennies on the dollar if one or both fail. Now if as you cite the Brannstrom situation If there was a trade return of a 1st round prospect and a 1st round pick or variation of pedigree talent return (like McLeod), then that's a viable hedge versus being painted into a corner as happened with their choice to passively slow play and hope. Stranger yet when Bowman himself saw an offer sheet situation in managing a championship level team in similar situation.

The Oilers are really no different than pretty much every contender since the cap came into play. Almost every year the top teams hit July with cap constraints and still guys like Holloway and Broberg always either sign cheap or it takes till the end of the summer.

And I don't actually think a proactive trade would have been much better. Broberg effectively got a decent 2nd, a 3rd and a prospect that we know here is actually trending quite well. Do you think any team gives you more than that if they also know the guy is looking to get paid. As I said Ottawa had to let Brannstrom walk with a $2M QO. CBJ let Boqvist walk facing a QO of $2.6M. Yes he has injury concerns but this is the consequence of over paying a player who has promise that is still unrealized. Do you think some team would have given them a 1st. McLeod got way more than anyone expected so it is possible but that trade had everyone stunned. Trades like that are rare.

Holloway may have gotten a second from someone, but again its not so clear. And I recognize that there was a rumour about Buch, but we don't know the details and that deal would have been strictly short term and would probably have meant no Arvidsson or no Skinner. So what is the better option:

Buch for one year vs Skinner, a 2nd, 2 3rd and Fischer. And Skinner may re-sign cheaply.

It of course depends on what they do with the 2nd, how Fischer turns out and how Skinner plays. But it is not a no brainer.

Teh problem with the get one singed scenario to fend off the OS is that there were consequences and opportunity costs for even a $300K overpay. Bowman's comments pretty much confirmed that they knew this. That would cost them a roster spot for the whole season this year and maybe more next year. You could argue that the Oilers should never have been in this tight a spot due to moves going back over the years. But that is a different story. And I even doubt Broberg would have signed for $1.5M. His concerns were clearly also about opportunity rather than just money.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

I like how in here you call it a historic, precedent setting move, yet also say the Oilers should’ve done a better job at managing it.

Both can be true. History and precedent setting only happens because one party is caught unaware and forced to be reactive to it. Think any NHL team will be caught again in these circumstances?