So, what happens is you look at 22, and we had a dead heat at 22. So, you have a D and a forward that happen to be our dead heat. And then you look at the draft, and if you look at our list – not any independent list – between 22 and 32, we would’ve had two defensemen left on our list, and then between 22 and 33, we had two defensemen but we had four forwards. I know it doesn’t make sense – that’s why it’s the short version. So, the odds of there being a defenseman there at 33 were less than half of what it was with there being a forward. That’s just your numbers. Now, you look at all the independent lists, and we identified two of those forwards we thought would be the ones to fall, so now it checks another box in terms of what may be there. So, what we did is we took a slight calculation of risking maybe losing the forward because if we lose those guys, the difference in depth between the four guys that we lose and the ones that would be available at 33 was much less than what you’d lose between a defenseman. So, if the two defensemen are on a scale of 1-100, the difference is 70. If the forwards go, the next forward, it’s like 20. So we kind of took a calculated risk saying that we wouldn’t get defensive value at 33, but we could still get forward value if our list went wrong. … I can’t tell you how stressful it was watching 27, 28, 29, and then once it got to 31, then we knew we’d get one of the two, and we’re like, ‘oh yeah, we’re geniuses.’ And I’m sitting there the whole time, like, ‘don’t [go poorly].’ I’m telling Rob this is a probability, and if a probability doesn’t happen, then I’d look like an idiot.
