An Analysis of Shot Quality During Patrick Roy's Prime
A. Style of Play
In the 1980s, Roy was playing on very strong defensive teams in Montreal. In the early '90s his teams were weaker overall, but still had some elite defensive players as well as Pat Burns, a noted defensive coach, who coached the Habs from 1989-1992. Newspapers and opposing teams from the late '80s talked often about Montreal's great defensive play:
"We knew they were strong defensively, but they've still surprised us at just how good they are. My hats off to the Montreal defense. They've shut us down. we haven't penetrated." (
Neil Sheehy, Calgary Flames)
"We've never been the Edmonton Oilers, and we'll never be the Edmonton Oilers. We just play our style, and the Canadiens are built around defense." (
Jean Perron, Montreal coach)
"Their backchecking has become so second nature that perfect positional play can almost be taken for granted. And behind all of that, their goaltender is competent, confident, and very appreciative of the rarity of rebounds around his net. "We play a patient game, and that way we can make no mistakes," said Roy, whose play is reminding his teammates of the form he showed as a rookie in 1986, the last year the Canadiens won the Stanley Cup." (
New York Times News Service, May 9, 1989)
"Whoever first said a good defense is the best offense must have had the Montreal Canadiens in mind. Going into last night's game, Montreal led its Stanley Cup semifinal series with the Philadelphia Flyers, 2-1, because of a suffocating defense." (
Associated Press, May 8, 1989)
B. Defensive Talent
One situation in which it is natural to expect a team's best defensive players to be utilized is on the penalty kill. Without ice time statistics, the best proxy to estimate which players were used most often on the PK is to look at on-ice goals for and against. Here are the top four Canadiens forwards and defencemen in power play goals against on the ice (i.e. the likely #1 and #2 PK units) for each of Roy's seasons in Montreal:
1986: Carbonneau, Gainey, McPhee, DeBlois; Ludwig, Robinson, Green, Lalor
1987: Carbonneau, Skrudland, Gainey, McPhee; Green, Chelios, Lalor, Ludwig
1988: Carbonneau, Gainey, Skrudland, McPhee; Ludwig, Chelios, Green, Robinson
1989: Carbonneau, Skrudland, Gainey, Walter; Ludwig, Chelios, Svoboda, Green
1990: Carbonneau, Walter, Keane, Skrudland; Ludwig, Chelios, Schneider, Lefebvre
1991: Carbonneau, Courtnall, Skrudland, Keane; Svoboda, Schneider, Desjardins, Lefebvre
1992: Carbonneau, Gilchrist, Muller, Corson; Desjardins, Daigneault, Schneider, Lefebvre
1993: Carbonneau, Muller, Keane, Damphousse; Desjardins, Daigneault, Schneider, Odelein
1994: Carbonneau, Muller, Keane, Wilson; Desjardins, Schneider, Odelein, Daigneault
1995: Keane, Lamb, Brunet, Ronan; Racine, Daigneault, Odelein, Brisebois
1996: Koivu, Damphousse, Rucinsky, Bureau; Popovic, Brisebois, Quintal, Odelein
And here's Hasek in Buffalo:
1994: Hannan, Wood, Khmylev, Presley; Muni, Smehlik, Bodger, Moller
1995: Presley, Khmylev, Hannan, Plante; Bodger, Smehlik, Galley, Muni
1996: Plante, Peca, LaFontaine, Holzinger; Shannon, Galley, Zhitnik, Wilson
1997: Peca, Holzinger, Ward, Plante; Wilson, Zhitnik, Shannon, Smehlik
1998: Plante, Peca, Holzinger, Ward; Smehlik, Zhitnik, Shannon, Wilson
1999: Peca, Ward, Holzinger, Satan; Smehlik, Zhitnik, Shannon, McKee
Two things are obvious from those lists:
1. Roy had much better defensive players in front of him.
2. The quality of Montreal's defensive players fell off very dramatically after 1994, roughly around the same time that his save percentages did.
By 1996, the Montreal Canadiens' top six defencemen in the playoffs were Patrice Brisebois, Stephane Quintal, Lyle Odelein, Peter Popovic, Rory Fitzpatrick and David Wilkie. It shouldn't be surprising, given the talent loss, that the team's save percentages declined over time as well.
C. Shot Prevention
Roy's shots against per 60 minutes numbers reinforce the story of Montreal's gradual defensive decline from elite to mediocre (league average in brackets):
1985-86: 26.8 (31.0)
1986-87: 27.0 (30.0)
1987-88: 29.0 (30.4)
1988-89: 26.9 (30.4)
1989-90: 28.8 (30.3)
1990-91: 28.8 (29.7)
1991-92: 27.5 (30.4)
1992-93: 30.3 (30.9)
1993-94: 30.3 (30.2)
1994-95: 31.7 (29.3)
1995-96: 31.8 (30.2)
Note that when there is less parity around the league, as there was in the 1980s, shots against are generally negatively correlated with save percentage, i.e. lower shots against tends to mean it is easier to achieve higher save percentages. For comparison's sake, here are Hasek's shots against per 60 numbers:
1994: 27.7 (30.2)
1995: 30.3 (29.3)
1996: 35.3 (30.2)
1997: 32.4 (29.7)
1998: 30.6 (27.3)
1999: 29.5 (27.8)
The Sabres were a good team in 1993-94. That also happens to be Hasek's best single regular season save percentage relative to league average. However, all observers would rate his absolute peak as 1998 or 1999, which again shows how save percentage relative to league average is not an all-defining metric.
D. Defensive Effort During the Regular Season in the 16 Team League
I presented data earlier that showed that the gap between regular season and playoff save percentages was higher in the 1980s than at any other point in the official save percentage era. A possible theory for this is that since 16 of 21 teams made the playoffs, it was not necessary for many teams to give a full defensive effort every night. Here's
Ken Dryden on the topic from the New York Times in May 1986:
"At the point of the season when the drudgery of defense becomes mandatory, the goaltender is the beneficiary. "The number of goals goes down," Dryden said. "The number of chances goes down. The number of rebounds goes down. The number of unharassed shooters - far fewer. The circumstances become far more cope-able, and you're far better able to succeed."
Many teams likely saw the drudgery of defence as only mandatory in the playoffs, but some coaches would have been likely to demand a defensive effort from their players every night. Disciplinary, defence-focused coaches like Pat Burns. For example, Patrick Roy's monthly splits during the Burns years do not tail off towards the end of the year as happened to some goalies on other teams that apparently lowered their effort after securing their playoff positioning.
There were also differences between the divisions and conferences, both in terms of strength and style of play. Between the start of the official save percentage era (1983-84) and the end of the divisional playoff rounds (1992-93), the average save percentage in the Wales Conference was .882 compared to .879 in the Campbell Conference. That is not a huge gap, but over that kind of sample size and that many teams it is a significant difference, and reinforces the general perception at the time that the Wales was the more defensive conference.
E. Backup Goalies
It is tough to estimate exactly what kind of impact Montreal's defence had on its goalie numbers. Patrick Roy strongly outperformed his backups from 1991 to 1994, and much of that was surely because of his own terrific play, but at the same time it is difficult to assess how good the other goalies were as nearly all of them had no playing time outside of Montreal. It's quite possible that they were all replacement level goalies, or even sub-replacement level, particularly Andre "Red Light" Racicot and his career .880 save percentage.
Prior to 1991 Roy was platooning with Brian Hayward, and the two often posted similar numbers. Hayward was probably a decent goalie, but his Montreal numbers were much better than what he managed to put up in Winnipeg. Because of a series of trades between the Jets and Habs, three goalies (Hayward, Steve Penney and Doug Soetaert) all played for both Winnipeg and Montreal in the 1980s.
Hayward: .866 on 4833 SA in WPG, .889 on 3655 SA in MTL
Penney: .828 on 320 SA in WPG, .865 on 1906 SA in MTL
Soetaert: .869 on 3896 SA in WPG, .873 on 1155 SA in MTL
Combined: .866 on 9049 SA in WPG, .880 on 6716 SA in MTL
Winnipeg was not always a strong team and had to face the Oilers and Flames very often, so they probably were below-average in shot quality against. Yet even if we assume that half of the combined difference is because of Jets' subpar play, that would still represent a .007 boost to save percentages in Montreal.
As for Dominik Hasek, every study I've ever seen on the topic shows he outplayed his backup goalies by a greater margin than any goalie ever.
F. Team Discipline
PPOA = Power Play Opportunities Against
Roy in Montreal:
1986: 307 PPOA (1st), 370 Avg
1987: 304 PPOA (2nd), 344 Avg
1988: 394 PPOA (2nd), 437 Avg
1989: 326 PPOA (1st), 403 Avg
1990: 295 PPOA (1st), 367 Avg
1991: 282 PPOA (1st), 366 Avg
1992: 320 PPOA (1st), 402 Avg
1993: 427 PPOA (8th), 443 Avg
1994: 390 PPOA (9th), 407 Avg
1995: 191 PPOA (5th), 209 Avg
Hasek in Buffalo:
1994: 380 PPOA (5th), 407 Avg
1995: 220 PPOA (17th), 209 Avg
1996: 461 PPOA (23rd), 413 Avg
1997: 364 PPOA (24th), 336 Avg
1998: 413 PPOA (24th), 380 Avg
1999: 399 PPOA (24th), 359 Avg
2000: 361 PPOA (21st), 331 Avg
2001: 334 PPOA (5th), 376 Avg
Once again it is notable that Montreal was less disciplined starting in 1992-93, the year that Roy's regular season numbers started to decline relative to league average.
The NHL's tracking of special teams stats since 1998 shows that the average save percentage on penalty kill shots is around .050 lower than it is at even strength. Goalies that face fewer opposing power plays therefore face relatively fewer shots on the dangerous PK, which boosts their save percentage. The typical range for teams at extreme ends of the team discipline scale is a .002-.003 gain or loss on their overall save percentage compared to an average goalie.
To illustrate, let's look at Hasek's 1997-98 and compare it to Martin Brodeur the same year, as the mid-'90s Devils were a disciplined defensive team that took few penalties (3rd fewest PPOA in the league that year), just like the 1980s Canadiens.
Hasek: .946 at EV, .891 on the PK, .932 on the PP, .932 overall
Brodeur: .928 at EV, .868 on the PK, .915 on the PP, .917 overall
Hasek faced 22.2% of his shots against on the penalty kill, Brodeur just 15.2%. The average goalie faced 20.4% on the PK.
If we take Hasek and Brodeur's situational save percentages and apply them to the average goalie's situational breakdown (i.e. 75.5% at EV, 20.4% PK, 4.1% PP), Hasek's save percentage would improve to .934 while Brodeur's drops to .915. I think +.002 for Roy and -.002 for Hasek is probably pretty close to the impact special teams factors had on their primes (although it might even be higher for Roy, because his great Montreal PK units likely suppressed PK shots against much better than the average team as well).
In summary, Roy likely gained .002-.003 on his save percentage in Montreal compared to an average goalie because of special teams factors, and likely at least that much again because of the team's shot quality at even strength. He also may have gained around .003 compared to a typical goalie in the Campbell Conference, which would be .001 or .002 compared to an randomly chosen goalie leaguewide.
Dominik Hasek almost certainly lost a couple of points for facing more power plays than average in most of his prime years. He may have faced easier than average shot quality in 1993-94, but there does not appear to be much evidence of it for his other seasons.
Summary
Roy benefitted from a defensive style of play in Montreal, playing behind excellent defensive talent that took fewer penalties than average.
Overall, shot quality factors seem to have inflated the difference between Roy and Hasek's primes. The special teams numbers alone seem to suggest that the difference between them is understated by .004-.005. Factoring in the style of play differences at even strength and what Montreal goalies did on other teams, the true difference could be as much as .010.
As a result, while Roy was very good from 1988 to 1992, I think the evidence suggests that his performance was not on the same level as Dominik Hasek from 1994-1999.