financing costs are going to be a killer, and drive the negotiations. If you look at what will cause variability in the model, my guess is it boils down to assumptions around exchange rate and discount rate. The rest is probably all pretty easy to model. Exchange rate largely a function of oil prices and differential economic growth, so the proponents will argue that the US is going to keep outpacing Canada and that we’ve hit peak oil. Use that to argue that FX should be capped at current rates which are weak by historical standards. They might even argue for 0.72 or something.
But since the way these data room models work is free cash flow based, the main driver of everything is the choice of discount rate, which is in the eye of the beholder.
I’ve seen models where revenue assumptions could swing 10-20%, but where the dominant force was still the choice of discount rate because of how long the investment horizon is. Here I’m assuming 20 years of free cash flows are modeled and they they apply a terminal value. Maybe they use the life building and go to 30. Over that horizon, the time value of money will dwarf all other factors in yielding a present value which +/- some goodwill represents the basis for an offer when you have privately held assets/companies where you can’t value the shares.
The Melnyks would want a low rate, might use some historical trailing rate to get some low years in, or a long long term average rate to smooth cycles. But buyers will use their weighted average cost of capital, which has shot through the roof. Those revenue streams change dramatically if you discount by 4% vs 7%.
there is a chasm between the value of this team at those two rates, which I’d say will be the main issue for negotiation. Prospective Owners might apply some discount factor for NCC regulatory risk in there absent a comfort letter. I suspect the sens get a comfort letter to mitigate that.