OT: The OT Thread: Meteorological Harassment (Warning in post 368)

[Beerz]

Experiencing first world problems right now- I'm dealing with the "log in/security error" when I try to log-in on my phone, which makes the sub-forums all buggy as hell. They rarely update threads with new posts, and it appears like I'm not logged in on the sub-forums.

It works fine on my desktop at work, though I'm rarely able to comment or browse at work. First world problems for sure!

I want to say I had that issue once... might have to clear cache or try a new browser. I recommend Brave

 

[Der Jaeger]

And, by virtue of the pay grade / GS level of those individuals, and the cost of living demographically in the beltway area, you will be cutting costs at above the mean / median of the average federal worker. I'd guess at least 2x higher. So the savings are disproportionately advantaged to the taxpayer.

The DC area headquarters are particularly burdensome because of cost of living.

But many of those headquarters are way to overbloated. I'm reading lots about the State Department and USAID. I've had years of experience with both. I'm glad they are cutting both. Most State Department workers are working in and around the beltway, and not in embassies or in foreign countries. A large part of the diplomatic mission is completed by special operations teams training foreign militaries, and DoD during partnered exercises.

About half my combat patrols in from my first Afghan deployment were DoS or USAID related. In many cases, I was the lead in completing the mission. In almost all cases, I had no one from DoS or USAID with me. That's a little hidden secret: most of the DoS and USAID missions are spearheaded by the DoD.

I remember a huge DoS project I was running in my first Afghan deployment. Anything that went off the rails, I got a pissy phone call from a DoS worker living in the safety of Jalalabad's base. The person trained in what I was doing was sitting in AC 100 miles from the actual mission, telling me what I needed to do. Neat.

To throw salt into the wound, when I was in grad school for national planning and policy, we'd have DoS guest instructors telling us how DoD was screwing everything up. The commissioned officers in the room basically would ask "where were you?" The answers always were beltway or some capital/big DoD base, safe from everything, writing white papers.

If you're interested, read "The Ugly American." Great perspective into how the DoS works and why it's not effective.

 

[Chainshot]

Sounds like some REMFs DJ.

 

[KiwiGriff]

The DC area headquarters are particularly burdensome because of cost of living.

But many of those headquarters are way to overbloated. I'm reading lots about the State Department and USAID. I've had years of experience with both. I'm glad they are cutting both. Most State Department workers are working in and around the beltway, and not in embassies or in foreign countries. A large part of the diplomatic mission is completed by special operations teams training foreign militaries, and DoD during partnered exercises.

About half my combat patrols in from my first Afghan deployment were DoS or USAID related. In many cases, I was the lead in completing the mission. In almost all cases, I had no one from DoS or USAID with me. That's a little hidden secret: most of the DoS and USAID missions are spearheaded by the DoD.

I remember a huge DoS project I was running in my first Afghan deployment. Anything that went off the rails, I got a pissy phone call from a DoS worker living in the safety of Jalalabad's base. The person trained in what I was doing was sitting in AC 100 miles from the actual mission, telling me what I needed to do. Neat.

To throw salt into the wound, when I was in grad school for national planning and policy, we'd have DoS guest instructors telling us how DoD was screwing everything up. The commissioned officers in the room basically would ask "where were you?" The answers always were beltway or some capital/big DoD base, safe from everything, writing white papers.

If you're interested, read "The Ugly American." Great perspective into how the DoS works and why it's not effective.

This one?

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/40180100-the-ugly-american

I probably won't get to it anytime soon but i've added it to my Want to Read shelf.

It's good to hear from people with firsthand experience of how things work in real life. (I wanted to use a metaphor in that sentence but "at the coalface" or "in the trenches" didn't feel right, even if the last one is at least military-themed).

Thanks for posting. It doesn't surprise me that the people complaining about how plans are being enacted dont have firsthand experience. I'm pretty sure Leif Babin and Jocko Willink talk about exactly that in their book. That's a good read too on leadership principles.

 

[Der Jaeger]

Sounds like some REMFs DJ.

I was recon, so everyone was rear echelon to me.

There were some really, really good DoS and USAID people too. But they were in the vast minority. It takes a really special person to go to another country an immerse themselves (and their family) in the culture and community there. That's actually what it takes to be great as a DoS or USAID worker. That's a huge ask, and in many cases, a dangerous ask. But it's what's required.

The offset has been DoS personnel who just stick to the embassy, or never leave the beltway. That's most of the DoS and USAID. Those folks can go and there would be no impact. Then they need to actively recruit the types of people who are willing to go living in Bangladesh or Jordan or Colombia and live among the people. That's how real diplomacy is done. Retired special forces personnel would be a great place to start. I'd go.

Unfortunately, DoS and USAID like ivory tower, white paper academics instead of dirt-under-the-fingernails grinders. Ironically, many of us have the same degrees they do.

 

[Der Jaeger]

This one?

https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/40180100-the-ugly-american

I probably won't get to it anytime soon but i've added it to my Want to Read shelf.

It's good to hear from people with firsthand experience of how things work in real life. (I wanted to use a metaphor in that sentence but "at the coalface" or "in the trenches" didn't feel right, even if the last one is at least military-themed).

Thanks for posting. It doesn't surprise me that the people complaining about how plans are being enacted dont have firsthand experience. I'm pretty sure Leif Babin and Jocko Willink talk about exactly that in their book. That's a good read too on leadership principles.

That's it. Here's the book details, and it's exactly what I'm talking about. Unfortunately, it hasn't changed.

A piercing exposé of American incompetence and corruption in Southeast Asia, The Ugly American captivated the nation when it was first published in 1958. The book introduces readers to an unlikely hero in the titular “ugly American”—and to the ignorant politicians and arrogant ambassadors who ignore his empathetic and commonsense advice. In linked stories and vignettes set in the fictional nation of Sarkhan, William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick draw an incisive portrait of American foreign policy gone dangerously wrong—and how it might be fixed.

Eerily relevant sixty years after its initial publication, The Ugly American reminds us that “today, as the battle for hearts and minds has shifted to the Middle East, we still can’t speak Sarkhanese” (New York Times).

 

[brian_griffin]

The DC area headquarters are particularly burdensome because of cost of living.

But many of those headquarters are way to overbloated. I'm reading lots about the State Department and USAID. I've had years of experience with both. I'm glad they are cutting both. Most State Department workers are working in and around the beltway, and not in embassies or in foreign countries. A large part of the diplomatic mission is completed by special operations teams training foreign militaries, and DoD during partnered exercises.

About half my combat patrols in from my first Afghan deployment were DoS or USAID related. In many cases, I was the lead in completing the mission. In almost all cases, I had no one from DoS or USAID with me. That's a little hidden secret: most of the DoS and USAID missions are spearheaded by the DoD.

I remember a huge DoS project I was running in my first Afghan deployment. Anything that went off the rails, I got a pissy phone call from a DoS worker living in the safety of Jalalabad's base. The person trained in what I was doing was sitting in AC 100 miles from the actual mission, telling me what I needed to do. Neat.

To throw salt into the wound, when I was in grad school for national planning and policy, we'd have DoS guest instructors telling us how DoD was screwing everything up. The commissioned officers in the room basically would ask "where were you?" The answers always were beltway or some capital/big DoD base, safe from everything, writing white papers.

If you're interested, read "The Ugly American." Great perspective into how the DoS works and why it's not effective.

(Apologies below to the journalism major, but I used some incomplete sentences to express thoughts stream of consciousness.)

My career has been in the private sector, 3.5 decades. I've had a successful track record in high tech mfg. & development.
Most importantly, I've learned from, worked with, hired, and taught/trained a few hundred very intelligent, competent, highly skilled, and motivated people.
Here, the various business units write white papers too. They are useful in stating assumptions, competitive threats, identifying and down-selecting strategies (market, technology, manufacturing, etc.) and, to a lesser extent, when combined with other white papers, offer a menu of options for executives to invest time, people, and money to pursue opportunities.
For my career, I've remained in "front line" manufacturing and technology development roles. Direct cost of manufacturing and new product development, transfer, and delivery. Pursued intentionally instead of ascending to staff roles / higher leadership roles. Part of that is my innate nature of personal reward / values. Part of it is not wanting to be excess indirect overhead when business cycles swing lean / fallow.
As a result, I likely forwent high-6-figures or even >7 figure of missed incremental salary/bonus over that career. No worries, as I've only had two stints in my career I couldn't sleep at night, and I still have my morals, and friendships. It's been good, all considered. I'm also frugal and therefore will never starve.
The good leaders in our organization listen when we correct their assumptions about the asymmetry and/or limitations of our capabilities which we can't overcome, and the reality of the time, effort, money to achieve the capabilities we need. It may take a few repetitions, but it usually works. Historically, our business has been very successful and perhaps our biggest flaw is we deliver late more than we'd like (but that's because we set high goals underpinned with optimism). I count only two (thankfully short-term) leaders in our organization in which I had no confidence. And my career will end without having another such leader. Our current leadership regime has limited / no history in our branch of the business. Maybe an analogy is a leadership cohort of either artillery or air cavalry experience also commanding an equal-sized unit of CeeBees. But they listen.
There are functions in our business which write some of those white papers, but also contribute little (guidance, decisions, resources, related support) to execute a strategy, yet tout the strategy.
In my business, if a white paper is "bad", it results in sales opportunities either not emerging or being underwhelmed vs. expectations. Or, capital money wasted which could have been invested elsewhere or returned to shareholders in dividends. Or, costs excessively high and profit margins missed. In egregious cases, it has resulted in a pull-back for a few months or years in business growth.
In your business / former business, if white papers are wrong, people can die - whether American forces, mercenaries, FMT/IMET advisees, etc.
I am no military historian, and I fully realize even well-considered objective historical views still have a lens, but from what little I've read, there are two analogies I've made which I seek to avoid:
1. The dual Westmoreland stubbornness of insufficiently listening to subordinates and then outwardly professing a path to success when inwardly admitting it will fail.
2. The McNamara hubris of believing the competition has a value and priority system aligned with your own.

 

[Der Jaeger]

(Apologies below to the journalism major, but I used some incomplete sentences to express thoughts stream of consciousness.)

My career has been in the private sector, 3.5 decades. I've had a successful track record in high tech mfg. & development.
Most importantly, I've learned from, worked with, hired, and taught/trained a few hundred very intelligent, competent, highly skilled, and motivated people.
Here, the various business units write white papers too. They are useful in stating assumptions, competitive threats, identifying and down-selecting strategies (market, technology, manufacturing, etc.) and, to a lesser extent, when combined with other white papers, offer a menu of options for executives to invest time, people, and money to pursue opportunities.
For my career, I've remained in "front line" manufacturing and technology development roles. Direct cost of manufacturing and new product development, transfer, and delivery. Pursued intentionally instead of ascending to staff roles / higher leadership roles. Part of that is my innate nature of personal reward / values. Part of it is not wanting to be excess indirect overhead when business cycles swing lean / fallow.
As a result, I likely forwent high-6-figures or even >7 figure of missed incremental salary/bonus over that career. No worries, as I've only had two stints in my career I couldn't sleep at night, and I still have my morals, and friendships. It's been good, all considered. I'm also frugal and therefore will never starve.
The good leaders in our organization listen when we correct their assumptions about the asymmetry and/or limitations of our capabilities which we can't overcome, and the reality of the time, effort, money to achieve the capabilities we need. It may take a few repetitions, but it usually works. Historically, our business has been very successful and perhaps our biggest flaw is we deliver late more than we'd like (but that's because we set high goals underpinned with optimism). I count only two (thankfully short-term) leaders in our organization in which I had no confidence. And my career will end without having another such leader. Our current leadership regime has limited / no history in our branch of the business. Maybe an analogy is a leadership cohort of either artillery or air cavalry experience also commanding an equal-sized unit of CeeBees. But they listen.
There are functions in our business which write some of those white papers, but also contribute little (guidance, decisions, resources, related support) to execute a strategy, yet tout the strategy.
In my business, if a white paper is "bad", it results in sales opportunities either not emerging or being underwhelmed vs. expectations. Or, capital money wasted which could have been invested elsewhere or returned to shareholders in dividends. Or, costs excessively high and profit margins missed. In egregious cases, it has resulted in a pull-back for a few months or years in business growth.
In your business / former business, if white papers are wrong, people can die - whether American forces, mercenaries, FMT/IMET advisees, etc.
I am no military historian, and I fully realize even well-considered objective historical views still have a lens, but from what little I've read, there are two analogies I've made which I seek to avoid:
1. The dual Westmoreland stubbornness of insufficiently listening to subordinates and then outwardly professing a path to success when inwardly admitting it will fail.
2. The McNamara hubris of believing the competition has a value and priority system aligned with your own.

You're getting deep into my topics! Love it!

We studied Vietnam quite a bit and had a Vietnam expert as one of our professors. He fought in Vietnam and Cambodia, and then went and worked in the Vietnamese embassy when it re-opened in 1992 (I think). He lives there part time and lives among the people.

Failures in Vietnam:
- "American diplomacy." Thinking we are better than the people and the opponent. JFK had it right with the Peace Corps and special operations. That's how you do it, not sending in hundreds of thousands of drafted kids.
- McNamara and the "whiz kids." Having smart math people in the room is like having an analytics section: you have to have it. But war, like sports, is a human endeavor. That counts more than the stats.
- Westmoreland fighting Vietnam like a traditional ground campaign. His advisors had some of the war figured out, but insurgencies aren't beaten by "getting your gun on." That, interestingly, was a huge problem in Afghanistan and Iraq. By the time Tet was won on the ground, it was lost in the media, as an example.