It’s also worth remembering the context of that matched offer sheet. In 2007, the team was less than a decade old, but through slowly building the team around a strong defense, the Preds had made the playoffs every season since the lockout, and we’re finally assembling offensive talents to get them over the hump — Kariya, Foppa, Hartnell, Radulov. Attendance was near the bottom of the league, but stable and gradually increasing. Then the team owner, Craig Leopold, started entertaining offers from series of sleazy prospective buyers who planned to move the team (to Kansas City, to Hamilton, maybe to Houston). When guys like Boots Del Biaggio and Jim Balsillie were exposed as dirtbags that the NHL wanted nothing to do with, Leopold told Poile to cut the payroll to the cap floor. Pit went Hartnell, Kimmo Timonen, Kariya, Peter Forsberg, and Tomas Vokoun, and Radulov soon fled for the KHL (and because the NHL had let the transfer agreement expire, the Preds lost all rights to him).
Fortunately, a new local ownership group took over from Leopold, but all the Preds really had left in 2008 were a few promising young players on the defensive side — Ryan Suter, Shea Weber, and Pekka Rinne. Weber, 23 at the time, was voted captain. Attendance plummeted, as the team missed the playoffs. But over the next few years, the team was rebuilt, and by 2011 matched their pre-fire sale point total as they finished 2nd in their division and actually won a playoff series for the first time. More importantly, support for the team went from a niche following to being embraced by the city, selling out games and building a fan culture unique in the league, with crowd chants that mixed the spirit of college hockey or European soccer with Lower Broad honkytonk rowdiness, and burgeoning traditions like the
catfish toss and the
3rd period TV timeout ovation.
The big concern for the front office was the impending expiry of bridge deals for their terrific blueline pair of Suter and Weber. During the 2011-12 season, Suter (imminently eligible for a UFA contract) assured Poile that he would settle down to business with the team at the end of the season, giving all indication that he wanted to stay. But when the season ended, Suter shocked everyone by signing a 13 year, $100 million contract with Minnesota, giving the Predators no opportunity to match. Then Philadelphia looked to drop a second bombshell on the team and its fans with a huge 14 year, $110 million offer sheet, frontloaded in a way to be as painful as possible to a team with limited cash on hand and a trickle of a revenue stream that basically kept the lights on.
Poile knew that losing both of his star defensemen in one season could be the death blow to a team which barely survived the gutting of its roster just a few years before. So he went to the ownership group hat in hand to ask for the cash to keep Weber — some $26 million up front. They agreed that the survival of the team depended upon proving to their fans that they could keep star players. I remember the season ticket drive following the matched offer sheet — the Preds explicitly told fans that their generous support was needed to pay for Weber. That’s not a problem that many NHL teams have, but it forged an even closer bond between the city and the team, and from then on, the Preds were an integral part of the fabric of the city. The whole organization changed after that. The team began a project of building skating facilities in different parts of the city, including immigrant-heavy Antioch, with a practice sheet for the Predators and additional sheets for youth leagues and public skating.
Frankly, the Predators had no choice but to match the Flyers’ offer sheet. But it is important to note that the offer sheet was frontloaded not as a means of cap circumvention, but to inflict as much financial pain as possible on a team struggling to stay in business. The hurdle that the Predators were forced to overcome was for the team to spend more money than they had on hand or could access without great difficulty. This was an example of a big wealthy team (owned by Comcast) bullying a small market, cash-poor team (owned by an LLC with a dozen mostly local investors, led by a guy who made his money disposing of medical waste). The cap circumvention penalty was not a consideration put forward by anyone at the time because it was frankly laughable that the Predators would ever be able to spend enough money on salaries to approach the salary cap. And in fact, during Weber’s four years with the Predators playing under the offer sheet deal, they only ever approached the salary cap for the last few months prior to the trade, a minuscule benefit that happened only as a consequence of a one-for-one player trade.
Nashville won’t be penalized one penny for cap circumvention, because (a) to punish them for matching an offer sheet designed to blow apart the team’s business side would be against the spirit of the cap circumvention rules, and (b) any benefit that accrued from the contingency of the structure of the contract was negligible, and the punishment would be vastly disproportionate to any transgression. Moreover, the league looked the other way when other teams who clearly circumvented the cap escaped using the LTIR loophole, so penalizing the Predators would be egregiously arbitrary.