Confirmed with Link: Oilers Do Not Match Broberg ($4.58M X2) & Holloway ($2.29M x 2) Offer Sheets | Oilers acquire STL 3rd '28 & Paul Fischer for Futures

[Fourier]

Their value would be 1st round picks at least. Holloway definitely didn't lose value, and even if Broberg lost some value, he was a high 1st rounder who just had a great playoffs. The proof that his value fell was also a small sample. Dmen are also expected to take a little longer, and Broberg is still very young. But sure, not 8th overall anymore but a mid 1st for sure

The compensation they received from St.Louis could be assessed as follows:

For Borberg: Mid range 2nd, a 3rd and Paul Fischer.

A mid tier 2nd and a 3rd with or without Fischer is basically a low 1st (22-32 range). A very cheap Broberg is maybe worth a little more than that but not much. But what about an unproven Broberg who is looking to get paid. Who was going to give you a better 1st. Certainly not any team that was not a lock to make the playoffs. And most playoff caliber teams would have issues with his potential contract demands. And for a playoff team that 1st is often viewed as a key asset to be used later to fill a more important hole at the deadline.

As far as a great playoffs, I think that is a stretch. His performance in the playoffs showed promise, as did his excellent play in the AHL, but he is still a 23 year old unproven defenseman. These things only get you so much. Ty Emberson was named the AHL East's best defensive defenseman, is a RHD who has about the same amount of NHL success as Borberg and is all of one year older and he is cheap. His value is a late round pick. Broberg's advantage is his draft pedigree but this is his D+5 year coming up. While he may well turn out to be a very good player, history suggests that such player do lose a lot of trade value. A cheap Broberg may well be worth a fair bit, but an expensive one, not as much

For Holloway: Two 3rd's which is basically a 2nd in the 33-40 range. Frankly, I doubt the Oilers would have gotten a first for Holloway. Again you have to look at who might be interested. No team in the bottom half gives you a first and likely no team that is not a lock to make the playoffs. That leaves you with maybe 10 teams that might give you a first. But why would they? Most of those teams have prospects like Holloway looking to break in. He does not really move the needle for you in the near future but again losing that first takes away a major asset you can use at the deadline to address a key need.

 

[North]

Imo that opinion is an example of the extreme fan bias for picks. A developed player is worth more than a question mark. Isn't a player taken at Holloway's draft position expected to pan out... exactly like he did? You aren't banking on a top line player, more like middle six.

True, they miss out on the lottery ticket aspect of a pick, but what's that truly worth? Plus based on Dmen, Broberg still has lottery ticket potential to be an impact top pairing guy. Of course he's worth more than a 1st

Actually l think the fan bias in question is on your end.

Nothing on how they have performed so far suggests first round picks coming back.

 

[Broberg Speed]

Robertson publicly states he wants out. The Leafs have their backs against the wall when it comes to the cap. No team signs Robertson to an offer sheet. Robertson signs a one year deal worth 875K.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

I could easily argue that unless they were explicitly told that there was an OS in play that there was no reason to increase their offers or to move either player. The vast majority of these situations, probably 95%+, resolve themselves in the team's favour. But if they were made aware of the threat of an offer sheet, or even strongly suspected it, trading the players would have been more challenging.

While not quite the same of course, we have recently seen some very good players let go because of the threat of pending arbitration, and not just by cap-strapped teams. Teams are always reluctant to give RFA's too much because of the significant inflationary impact such deals have and those that are in a position to sign for more than the norm have seen their value decrease substantially. Neither player was arbitration eligible, but any significant known or even perceived threat of an OS would have had a similar dampening effect. It seems clear that any team looking to acquire these guys would have similar knowledge of the situation. Aside from St. Louis the threat of a significant OS would have been an issue for any team looking to deal for the pair or individually, reducing the compensation.

From a risk management point of view I still do not see any significant error that management made. They did not lose the players for nothing, nor were they ever at any risk of doing so. At best the compensation that they might have received would very likely have been only a modest improvement on what they got. That is just a historical fact. Frankly, as much as I am disappointed that they lost both players, because of the extreme value of cap space to this team, I actually think that at least for the next two years the team is currently in a stronger position to succeed than they would have been had they given them much more than they were offered.

Unfortunately 95% is not 100% and past performance is no guarantee of future performance. The market had changed with cash infusion and the Oilers had multiple vulnerabilities including a damaged player relationship with an in-season trade demand.

The cap landscape is changing with young players including restricted free agents both in terms of increasingly leveraging the CBA for their benefit and in teams making hard calls on players perceived to not be worth their contract or potentially inflated with the uncertainty of arbitration (still a smaller number). Reinforces making hard decisions faster on players in evaluating all associated risks. We don't know the reality of the trade market as most of us were surprised that McLeod was dealt for a recent top 10 prospect. GM's all prefer to make trades over utilizing the inflationary scorched earth vehicle that the offer sheet generates. Exploring the trade market pro-actively is just good business.

A similar buying spree team was Nashville who invested over $20 million on players on signing days but still left cap money to mitigate against their restricted free agent (though a mid roster winger is a minimal threat). There's a decent article about Trotz's situation with Askarov and changing his approach once the player went public with trade demand.

Trotz said the San Jose Sharks made the most sense because he'd been chatting frequently with general manager Mike Grier during the summer. "(Grier) and I touch base a lot," Trotz said. "Always talking about what you might do with your team, this guy or that guy. Then when the request was made public, the seriousness of our discussions became a little more real."

https://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/nhl/predators/2024/08/23/nashville-predators-trade-yaroslav-askarov-sharks-barry-trotz/74925918007/

Now Nashville is not Edmonton with three cornerstone contracts needing to be negotiated but it would make sense to get a firm handle on your two expected young roster players early to ensure both certainty for cost and roster. They let the exclusive negotiating window slip by with no action and pursued their day 1 free agent strategy which left them vulnerable. Actively exploring all potential situations, signing the players within your internal budget range for them, discuss trade situations with other GM's, move up your decision making timeline to mitigate your vulnerabilities. You ensure either cost control on two NHL ready players who you've planned to be on your roster today and part of your succession planning for an older veteran d-corp and top six wings. Or you pursue a McLeod type deal with a team looking for NHL ready players entering prime years while giving up some futures. The hockey world watched both Broberg and Holloway play in their sports highest level of competition. So there's recency bias to leverage along with the highly successful AHL reset done by Broberg.

The player loss won't hurt this season but it does hurt the succession planning of a team with aging veterans, a marginal prospect pool, and depleting assets. As a mid-roster winger, Holloway is easier to replace as we saw with the pivot to second chance Podzkolzin. Broberg was always the prize and the real viable threat to walk. We disagree about the risk and approaches involved, the consequences is that the external market stepped in to value Broberg beyond Edmonton management's budget threshold. The threat of offer sheets might be low, 5%, but can move to 100% when all the conditions are ripe to be exploited. In this case it cost the Oilers their two young pedigree players they had anticipated to be on the roster. Now with Ceci, Desharnais, Broberg out, there is a big roster gap to fill at a position that has scarcity and carries a price premium.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

The compensation they received from St.Louis could be assessed as follows:

For Borberg: Mid range 2nd, a 3rd and Paul Fischer.

A mid tier 2nd and a 3rd with or without Fischer is basically a low 1st (22-32 range). A very cheap Broberg is maybe worth a little more than that but not much. But what about an unproven Broberg who is looking to get paid. Who was going to give you a better 1st. Certainly not any team that was not a lock to make the playoffs. And most playoff caliber teams would have issues with his potential contract demands. And for a playoff team that 1st is often viewed as a key asset to be used later to fill a more important hole at the deadline.

As far as a great playoffs, I think that is a stretch. His performance in the playoffs showed promise, as did his excellent play in the AHL, but he is still a 23 year old unproven defenseman. These things only get you so much. Ty Emberson was named the AHL East's best defensive defenseman, is a RHD who has about the same amount of NHL success as Borberg and is all of one year older and he is cheap. His value is a late round pick. Broberg's advantage is his draft pedigree but this is his D+5 year coming up. While he may well turn out to be a very good player, history suggests that such player do lose a lot of trade value. A cheap Broberg may well be worth a fair bit, but an expensive one, not as much

For Holloway: Two 3rd's which is basically a 2nd in the 33-40 range. Frankly, I doubt the Oilers would have gotten a first for Holloway. Again you have to look at who might be interested. No team in the bottom half gives you a first and likely no team that is not a lock to make the playoffs. That leaves you with maybe 10 teams that might give you a first. But why would they? Most of those teams have prospects like Holloway looking to break in. He does not really move the needle for you in the near future but again losing that first takes away a major asset you can use at the deadline to address a key need.

If reporting is trusted, the trade deadline market speculation was a 60+ point, 25-30 goal scoring winger Bushnevich with multiple year retention for Broberg and Holloway. So that too is a reference point in speculating trade scenario value. We saw McLeod return a top 10 pedigree draft pick which surprised virtually everyone I dare say. Trades are made for a number of reasons and the returns often surprise.

It's also reasonable to think that the right situation in markets that have stalled in their growth and have more urgency to improve their roster might value NHL ready talent over future hopefuls in their system. Ability to accelerate their today roster with an age 23 big puck moving d-man who stepped into deep playoff competition after a month of inactivity and kept his head above water. Even a more plentiful winger position in Holloway showed ability to play with an elite Draisaitl and top six ice-time in hard-fought deep playoff competition.

I agree about the first round picks. They are coveted as assets and likely hard to give up for Broberg. There's a different psychology of value around first round picks for teams and fans even if the bottom drops out of likelihood of success beginning after about the tenth pick. Zero chance Holloway nets a first. Broberg maybe a stretch but again depends on your evaluation of the player's latent upside. Size, skating, puck mover, age and a position that is known for later development and a full evaluation consideration by many experts to feel require a 200 NHL game threshold.

As McLeod showed, it's not a stretch to see NHL teams, especially ones with deep prospect pools, sacrifice some future hope for NHL ready talent.

 

[Broberg Speed]

From the picks and the prospect received as compensation, including what the team got for future considerations, the probability the Oilers received a single asset that plays 100 games in the NHL isn't great. If any of these assets do turn out to be anything of note the club will be waiting for years for the players to develop.

The Oilers must go into trade mode. Now and at the deadline. It's time to go all in. That includes any prospect currently in the system and any pick. Players have to be moved for salary purposes. Double retention has to be considered.

If the Oilers wait until the deadline teams are going to play hardball with the Oilers. Gun to the head time. Get it done now or face the dire consequences in March... then the playoffs.

 

[AM]

From the picks and the prospect received as compensation, including what the team got for future considerations, the probability the Oilers received a single asset that plays 100 games in the NHL isn't great. If any of these assets do turn out to be anything of note the club will be waiting for years for the players to develop.

The Oilers must go into trade mode. Now and at the deadline. It's time to go all in. That includes any prospect currently in the system and any pick. Players have to be moved for salary purposes. Double retention has to be considered.

If the Oilers wait until the deadline teams are going to play hardball with the Oilers. Gun to the head time. Get it done now or face the dire consequences in March... then the playoffs.

However the 4+M salary cap will play this year for the oilers.

 

[Broberg Speed]

However the 4+M salary cap will play this year for the oilers.

I have extreme doubts this narrative is going to work out. Likely the last chance the Oilers have to win a cup will have ended in failure.

 

[AM]

I have extreme doubts this narrative is going to work out. Likely the last chance the Oilers have to win a cup will have ended in failure.

They will have to play it by ear and take opportunities which present themselves. You know, much like the hockey players have to do.

It might be a good idea to review all the teams and identify players who might be available that could be good fits.

 

[Broberg Speed]

They will have to play it by ear and take opportunities which present themselves. You know, much like the hockey players have to do.

It might be a good idea to review all the teams and identify players who might be available that could be good fits.

Good idea.

I'm straight up following Montreal and Calgary prospects. With so many picks they're bound to let good young players slip through their fingers over the next decade. They can only prioritize and develop a handful of players at a time and there will be plenty of late bloomers to keep an eye on that will go un-signed or hit the waiver wire.

 

[AM]

Good idea.

I'm straight up following Montreal and Calgary prospects. With so many picks they're bound to let good young players slip through their fingers over the next decade. They can only prioritize and develop a handful of players at a time and there will be plenty of late bloomers to keep an eye on that will go un-signed or hit the waiver wire.

That’s the right idea.

 

[PositiveCashFlow]

I don't know if there's anything to this

https://x.com/i/web/status/1833569470654386459

 

[Tobias Kahun]

I don't know if there's anything to this

https://x.com/i/web/status/1833569470654386459

I’ll take things that didn’t happen for 500 alex

 

[Fourier]

Unfortunately 95% is not 100% and past performance is no guarantee of future performance. The market had changed with cash infusion and the Oilers had multiple vulnerabilities including a damaged player relationship with an in-season trade demand.

The cap landscape is changing with young players including restricted free agents both in terms of increasingly leveraging the CBA for their benefit and in teams making hard calls on players perceived to not be worth their contract or potentially inflated with the uncertainty of arbitration (still a smaller number). Reinforces making hard decisions faster on players in evaluating all associated risks. We don't know the reality of the trade market as most of us were surprised that McLeod was dealt for a recent top 10 prospect. GM's all prefer to make trades over utilizing the inflationary scorched earth vehicle that the offer sheet generates. Exploring the trade market pro-actively is just good business.

A similar buying spree team was Nashville who invested over $20 million on players on signing days but still left cap money to mitigate against their restricted free agent (though a mid roster winger is a minimal threat). There's a decent article about Trotz's situation with Askarov and changing his approach once the player went public with trade demand.

Trotz said the San Jose Sharks made the most sense because he'd been chatting frequently with general manager Mike Grier during the summer. "(Grier) and I touch base a lot," Trotz said. "Always talking about what you might do with your team, this guy or that guy. Then when the request was made public, the seriousness of our discussions became a little more real."

https://www.tennessean.com/story/sports/nhl/predators/2024/08/23/nashville-predators-trade-yaroslav-askarov-sharks-barry-trotz/74925918007/

Now Nashville is not Edmonton with three cornerstone contracts needing to be negotiated but it would make sense to get a firm handle on your two expected young roster players early to ensure both certainty for cost and roster. They let the exclusive negotiating window slip by with no action and pursued their day 1 free agent strategy which left them vulnerable. Actively exploring all potential situations, signing the players within your internal budget range for them, discuss trade situations with other GM's, move up your decision making timeline to mitigate your vulnerabilities. You ensure either cost control on two NHL ready players who you've planned to be on your roster today and part of your succession planning for an older veteran d-corp and top six wings. Or you pursue a McLeod type deal with a team looking for NHL ready players entering prime years while giving up some futures. The hockey world watched both Broberg and Holloway play in their sports highest level of competition. So there's recency bias to leverage along with the highly successful AHL reset done by Broberg.

The player loss won't hurt this season but it does hurt the succession planning of a team with aging veterans, a marginal prospect pool, and depleting assets. As a mid-roster winger, Holloway is easier to replace as we saw with the pivot to second chance Podzkolzin. Broberg was always the prize and the real viable threat to walk. We disagree about the risk and approaches involved, the consequences is that the external market stepped in to value Broberg beyond Edmonton management's budget threshold. The threat of offer sheets might be low, 5%, but can move to 100% when all the conditions are ripe to be exploited. In this case it cost the Oilers their two young pedigree players they had anticipated to be on the roster. Now with Ceci, Desharnais, Broberg out, there is a big roster gap to fill at a position that has scarcity and carries a price premium.

As I pointed out previously this is about the fourth time we have seen a signifcant salary reset since the cap came into play and we have had multiple instances of cap increases as large or larger in proportion to what we are seeing today. In each of the previous three reset situations there was a big jump for the top dogs and premium RFA's that was followed by smaller but observable increases for key secondary players like top 3 defensemen, top six forwards, particularly centers, and then starting goalies. In all three previous rests, teams continued to squeeze players like Holloway and Broberg. They did this to make sure they had resources for their key signings and room to at least explore the FA market.

Every GM knows that the one class of players they actually have any leverage over is the non-elite prospect coming off their ELC without arbitration rights. But this group also impacts the guys with arbitration rights by upping the comparables so giving in to guys like Holloway or Broberg is immediately and significantly inflationary.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

As I pointed out previously this is about the fourth time we have seen a signifcant salary reset since the cap came into play and we have had multiple instances of cap increases as large or larger in proportion to what we are seeing today. In each of the previous three reset situations there was a big jump for the top dogs and premium RFA's that was followed by smaller but observable increases for key secondary players like top 3 defensemen, top six forwards, particularly centers, and then starting goalies. In all three previous rests, teams continued to squeeze players like Holloway and Broberg. They did this to make sure they had resources for their key signings and room to at least explore the FA market.

Every GM knows that the one class of players they actually have any leverage over is the non-elite prospect coming off their ELC without arbitration rights. But this group also impacts the guys with arbitration rights by upping the comparables so giving in to guys like Holloway or Broberg is immediately and significantly inflationary.

I appreciate your points. I also view the player approach to managing their short career is also evolving as we see young talent now increasingly assert themselves through a wide variety of CBA mechanisms to cherry pick their preferred destination to live and work. Now there's an extreme case in Broberg and Holloway who both chose financial security and opportunity over a Cup contender organization. I've been interested to listen to GM Trotz speak fairly openly in a couple interviews about a changing attitude in younger players. It's a trend worth watching and old ways of conducting business - whether slow cook prospects, inconsistent development or perceived roadblock to playing, financial drag on earning potential, or No Canada.

Some young players are good enough to manifest their dreams. The Blues believe Broberg is a top 4 d-man and have a position and invested the salary required to find out. We'll see how Holloway fairs with a solid pedigree prospect pool of forwards bubbling up behind him. Others will get squeezed out as their salary doesn't align with team budget or role. Keep an eye on your kids. All might be part of a new phase of player management relationship within the CBA.

 

[aspin3]

From the picks and the prospect received as compensation, including what the team got for future considerations, the probability the Oilers received a single asset that plays 100 games in the NHL isn't great. If any of these assets do turn out to be anything of note the club will be waiting for years for the players to develop.

The Oilers must go into trade mode. Now and at the deadline. It's time to go all in. That includes any prospect currently in the system and any pick. Players have to be moved for salary purposes. Double retention has to be considered.

If the Oilers wait until the deadline teams are going to play hardball with the Oilers. Gun to the head time. Get it done now or face the dire consequences in March... then the playoffs.

Thankfully Bowman is not going your route but they are focusing on development with some more hires to come in that regard. Your scenario is how one gets the full 3rd and 4th line and bottom three dmen being all AHL players.

 

[Oilslick941611]

I’ll take things that didn’t happen for 500 alex

Leon was Paris at this time.