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Montreal 1972. Faced with the decision how to line up against the Soviet Union in Game 1 of the upcoming Summit Series, Team Canada head coach Harry Sinden decides to go with four forward lines and two defensive pairings (plus one spare). His reasoning: Constant Canadian attacks with four lines should keep the Soviets bottled in their own end and allow the Canadians with their superior shooting to put permanent pressure on the Soviet net. Things will turn out differently though. The Canadian NHL stars jump to a 2-0 lead, but the Soviets with their superior passing manage to keep possession of the puck for most of the game and launch one attack after the other. Team Canada is upset and concedes an unexpected defeat: 3-7.
Harry Sinden's expectation of how the game would go down might in part have been shaped by his own experience playing against the Soviets 15 years earlier.
Toronto 1957. Game 1 of the first-ever Soviet tour of Canada. Facing off against Whitby Dunlops – captained by a defenceman named Harry Sinden –, the Soviet national team (under head coach Anatoli Tarasov) jumped to a 2-0 lead and their passing game stunned Canadian players such as Frank Bonello who noted that "they were throwing the puck around like magicians". [1] However, the Dunlops recovered quickly. They disrupted further Soviet attacks with their physical play and backchecking and then proceeded to flood the Soviet zone with an aggressive forecheck: "the Dunlops threw five men at them", as the Montreal Gazette reports. [2] The visitors were bottled in the defensive zone and, overwhelmed by the traffic on the unfamiliarly small NHL-sized rink, showed "little know-how in their own end". [3] The Soviets conceded defeat: 2-7.
Three months later, Soviet team captain Nikolai Sologubov wrote about the experience in an article for the Russian monthly Sportivnye igry ("Sporting Games"). [4] Sologubov says that by mutual agreement, four forward lines were used by both teams and that this enabled the Canadians to constantly renew their aggressive forays with fresh legs and to wear the two Soviet defensive pairings (Tregubov/Sologubov and Ukolov/Sidorenkov) down:
Montreal Gazette report on Game 1 of the 1957 Soviet tour
It's safe to say that this is what Harry Sinden hoped would happen again 15 years later in Montreal when he opted to use four forward lines. Not only did it fail to materialize, but what's more, it was now the turn of the two Canadian defensive pairings (plus one spare) to become "very exhausted" and overwhelmed by the continuous whirlwind of Soviet attacks. The Soviets, on their part, used three defensive pairings (plus one spare) in 1972 and changed their defencemen as frequently as their forwards – something Sologubov demands in his article in the wake of the Whitby game.
In their first encounters with Canadian teams on the international stage in the mid-1950s, the Soviets had already observed that Canadian defencemen tended to be much more actively involved in the offensive game than most of their Soviet counterparts. In 1957, Sologubov made another observation: the Soviet forwards were inferior to the Canadian forwards when it came to backchecking.
Under the impression of the Whitby game, Sologubov – who was a renowned two-way defenceman himself, but remained exceptional in the Soviet Union – called for closer cooperation and more interchangeability between Soviet forwards and Soviet defencemen. Slogans like "five players on attack and five players on defence" became guiding themes for Soviet hockey. In order to faciliate the offensive contribution of the defencemen, young forwards such as Vitali Davydov and Viktor Kuzkin were converted to defencemen. Meanwhile, the defensive game of the Soviet forwards improved enough for backchecking to be listed among the areas in which the Soviets outdid Team Canada in Game 1 of the 1972 Summit Series. [5]
Tarasov advising against "universalism" in hockey (February 1957)
Just how far this interchangeability should go was a controversial question. Sologubov envisioned "universal players" equally versed in attacking and defending, and in the Soviet league Nikolai Epshtein (head coach of the club Khimik Voskresensk) tried to create such universal players who would be capable of switching positions at will. But in the mind of Anatoli Tarasov, this approach went too far. He had already spoken out against the tendency towards "universalism" in his foreword to Lloyd Percival's Hockey Handbook in early 1957 [6], and he would continue to do so throughout the 1960s. Tarasov argued that Soviet hockey should be based on specialization and that too much offensive involvement by the defencemen posed a defensive risk – arguments he kept repeating even as he gradually adapted his views and e.g. moved away from his opposition against forwards playing the point on the powerplay.
By the second half of the 1960s, Tarasov was ready to use offensive defencemen he labeled "halfbacks" – but only if paired with stay-at-home defencemen. Tarasov's long-time senior colleague with the national team, Arkadi Chernyshov, albeit known as defensive-minded, was pragmatist enough to embrace a new approach that promised to work, but making it work was precisely the difficult part: Soviet hockey was lacking defencemen with the two-way skillset required to play "halfback" and the only promising candidate of international calibre, Viktor Blinov, died an untimely death at the tender age of 22 (1968). When a new brand of offensive-minded defencemen such as Bobby Orr (Canada), Lennart Svedberg (Sweden) and Jan Suchý (Czechoslovakia) appeared in hockey in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union didn't have an adequate counterpart.
If the Soviet national team nevertheless had effective answers to Team Canada's approach in Game 1 of the 1972 Summit Series, they owed a lot of it to their experience from games against Canadian teams with similiar approaches – and not the least from Game 1 of their first-ever tour of Canada 15 years earlier. More level-headed backchecking by the forwards, quick passing to leave forecheckers trailing and defencemen stepping up to support the attack were among the lasting additions to the tactical repertoire prompted by the Canadian lessons. Ironically, it might have been the same experience that gave Harry Sinden his idea of how to play against the Soviets in 1972.
[1] From Greg Franke's great book Epic Confrontation: Canada vs. Russia on Ice (2018), page 133
[2] Montreal Gazette, November 23 1957, page 8
[3] same
[4] Nikolai Sologubov: Vse - v zashchite, vse - v napadenii. In: Sportivnye igry, February 1958, pages 5-6
[5] Harry Sinden in the Montreal Gazette, September 4 1972, page 14
[6] See: Lloyd Percival and Soviet Hockey (Part 2), 2021
Posted on Behind the Boards (SIHR Blog)
Harry Sinden's expectation of how the game would go down might in part have been shaped by his own experience playing against the Soviets 15 years earlier.
Toronto 1957. Game 1 of the first-ever Soviet tour of Canada. Facing off against Whitby Dunlops – captained by a defenceman named Harry Sinden –, the Soviet national team (under head coach Anatoli Tarasov) jumped to a 2-0 lead and their passing game stunned Canadian players such as Frank Bonello who noted that "they were throwing the puck around like magicians". [1] However, the Dunlops recovered quickly. They disrupted further Soviet attacks with their physical play and backchecking and then proceeded to flood the Soviet zone with an aggressive forecheck: "the Dunlops threw five men at them", as the Montreal Gazette reports. [2] The visitors were bottled in the defensive zone and, overwhelmed by the traffic on the unfamiliarly small NHL-sized rink, showed "little know-how in their own end". [3] The Soviets conceded defeat: 2-7.
Three months later, Soviet team captain Nikolai Sologubov wrote about the experience in an article for the Russian monthly Sportivnye igry ("Sporting Games"). [4] Sologubov says that by mutual agreement, four forward lines were used by both teams and that this enabled the Canadians to constantly renew their aggressive forays with fresh legs and to wear the two Soviet defensive pairings (Tregubov/Sologubov and Ukolov/Sidorenkov) down:
We were faced with a continuos whirlwind of attacks. And since we defencemen didn't have the opportunity to rest, we became very exhausted and made plenty of mistakes.
Montreal Gazette report on Game 1 of the 1957 Soviet tour
It's safe to say that this is what Harry Sinden hoped would happen again 15 years later in Montreal when he opted to use four forward lines. Not only did it fail to materialize, but what's more, it was now the turn of the two Canadian defensive pairings (plus one spare) to become "very exhausted" and overwhelmed by the continuous whirlwind of Soviet attacks. The Soviets, on their part, used three defensive pairings (plus one spare) in 1972 and changed their defencemen as frequently as their forwards – something Sologubov demands in his article in the wake of the Whitby game.
In their first encounters with Canadian teams on the international stage in the mid-1950s, the Soviets had already observed that Canadian defencemen tended to be much more actively involved in the offensive game than most of their Soviet counterparts. In 1957, Sologubov made another observation: the Soviet forwards were inferior to the Canadian forwards when it came to backchecking.
When our forwards try to help the defencemen in difficult minutes, they usually make the mistake of playing in the same rhythm as when attacking the goal of the opponent. But the defensive game requires a different rhythm, one primarily suited to ensure the soundness and flawlessness of the operations. When playing in the defence, you need the ability to see through the deceptive moves of the forwards and to pick the most advantageous position to protect your goal.
Under the impression of the Whitby game, Sologubov – who was a renowned two-way defenceman himself, but remained exceptional in the Soviet Union – called for closer cooperation and more interchangeability between Soviet forwards and Soviet defencemen. Slogans like "five players on attack and five players on defence" became guiding themes for Soviet hockey. In order to faciliate the offensive contribution of the defencemen, young forwards such as Vitali Davydov and Viktor Kuzkin were converted to defencemen. Meanwhile, the defensive game of the Soviet forwards improved enough for backchecking to be listed among the areas in which the Soviets outdid Team Canada in Game 1 of the 1972 Summit Series. [5]
Tarasov advising against "universalism" in hockey (February 1957)
Just how far this interchangeability should go was a controversial question. Sologubov envisioned "universal players" equally versed in attacking and defending, and in the Soviet league Nikolai Epshtein (head coach of the club Khimik Voskresensk) tried to create such universal players who would be capable of switching positions at will. But in the mind of Anatoli Tarasov, this approach went too far. He had already spoken out against the tendency towards "universalism" in his foreword to Lloyd Percival's Hockey Handbook in early 1957 [6], and he would continue to do so throughout the 1960s. Tarasov argued that Soviet hockey should be based on specialization and that too much offensive involvement by the defencemen posed a defensive risk – arguments he kept repeating even as he gradually adapted his views and e.g. moved away from his opposition against forwards playing the point on the powerplay.
By the second half of the 1960s, Tarasov was ready to use offensive defencemen he labeled "halfbacks" – but only if paired with stay-at-home defencemen. Tarasov's long-time senior colleague with the national team, Arkadi Chernyshov, albeit known as defensive-minded, was pragmatist enough to embrace a new approach that promised to work, but making it work was precisely the difficult part: Soviet hockey was lacking defencemen with the two-way skillset required to play "halfback" and the only promising candidate of international calibre, Viktor Blinov, died an untimely death at the tender age of 22 (1968). When a new brand of offensive-minded defencemen such as Bobby Orr (Canada), Lennart Svedberg (Sweden) and Jan Suchý (Czechoslovakia) appeared in hockey in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union didn't have an adequate counterpart.
If the Soviet national team nevertheless had effective answers to Team Canada's approach in Game 1 of the 1972 Summit Series, they owed a lot of it to their experience from games against Canadian teams with similiar approaches – and not the least from Game 1 of their first-ever tour of Canada 15 years earlier. More level-headed backchecking by the forwards, quick passing to leave forecheckers trailing and defencemen stepping up to support the attack were among the lasting additions to the tactical repertoire prompted by the Canadian lessons. Ironically, it might have been the same experience that gave Harry Sinden his idea of how to play against the Soviets in 1972.
[1] From Greg Franke's great book Epic Confrontation: Canada vs. Russia on Ice (2018), page 133
[2] Montreal Gazette, November 23 1957, page 8
[3] same
[4] Nikolai Sologubov: Vse - v zashchite, vse - v napadenii. In: Sportivnye igry, February 1958, pages 5-6
[5] Harry Sinden in the Montreal Gazette, September 4 1972, page 14
[6] See: Lloyd Percival and Soviet Hockey (Part 2), 2021
Posted on Behind the Boards (SIHR Blog)
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