Fourier
Registered User
I suspect that with the bolded comments above you are actually arguing my point for me. Both Dobson and Bouchard settled for a lot less than they could have gotten if there were broad threats of offer sheets. Both players and Hartley as well had their values set not by the open market but by the amount of cap space that their teams could afford to give them when they had no contract leverage. I have no doubt that had the Oilers had the space to give Bouchard something like $6M x 4 years they would have done so. But they basically gave him every penny they had left to give after taking care of all the other players first.The operate consideration is bolded. Their organizational situations were fundamentally different. And there's always contract outliers like Faber but a great example of a team prioritizing its in-house talent and pro-actively locking it up. The contrast with Harley situation is that he accepted a deal that aligns with the majority of his peers, notably Bouchard and Dobson. He was developed well by a strong organization and his path clear in his deployment. Unfortunately the Oilers had two players at risk and reporting suggests both didn't see a clear opportunity path with their team which is chasing a Cup.
The similarity with an analytics driven organization Carolina is that the players involved were at premiums positions, centre and defense, and a viable age with clear developmental upside. The only way to get such players through offer sheeting is to make a reach offer that has to be weighed against cap cost, belief or not that latent potential can be realized, available roster spot, etc. Fact is that the KK offer sheet required a 1st round pick +. Flight risk Broberg and Holloway were gambled at pushing a lesser compensation level.
We're both in hypothetical land. There was a viable choice to act quicker and assertively to determine the signability or not of Broberg and Holloway. They had been trade discussion pieces previously and a value set with Bushnevich and some level of retention (possibly as high as 50%). There was a runway of exclusive negotiation window until July 1. An open market window until August 13 when the market assigned a new value. The old model worked until it didn't work with $5 million more dollars in the system, a player at a coveted position and stage of development, and a second risk option. The key consideration is a player who asked for a trade request.
Again, we land at a different opinion based upon hypotheticals. It's okay and I get the frustration of a repeating argument.
You have talked about a salary reset. The Faber contract is exactly the type of deal we see in such a rest not what you saw from Broberg and Holloway. Teams look at guys who they think will be in their absolute core and lock them up as long as they can if they can do it. Harley at $8.5M x 8 would have been very much in line. Montreal signed Guhle at $5.5M for 6 years and he has far less of a resume. Lukas Raymond and Seth Jarvis also got big deals. Matty Beniers got $7.14M despite taking a step back. Byfield got 5 years at $6.25M from the cap squeezed Kings. Again, he probably gets more for longer if the Kings had space to do so. And after that signing they still put the squeeze to Kaliyev. Everyone of these player could have aggressively pursued offer sheets to get more. But my guess is that none of them came close to that option nor did any of their teams worry much about the threat or do anything pro-active to defend against a theoretical one. So why would the Oilers do anything that risks their cap structure for two players neither of whom are really core players in the next two years even if there was a risk of an OS?