Rumor: Rumors & Proposals Thread | Vegas Claim & Somehow Assign Lavoie to Farm... because Oilers.

[Canovin]

If Marcus Petterson can play on the right side, I would go after him. He's due for a serious raise tho

 

[LTIR]

I hope you realize Zub is getting extremely overrated here. He's an above average defender.

He is probably the best one on that team.
We extremely overrate Ekholm here in Edmonton too even when he is just an above avg Dman

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

The bolded is just not the case. Take Thomas Harley for example. His comparable would be Brock Faber who the Wild just signed a year in advance for 8 years @ $8.5M. That is a contract that Dallas could have been forced to give Harley if they believed an OS was a real threat. Theoretically a team like Utah could have offered him two years at $9.1M and if Dallas matched they would have been sitting right now with $4.5M to shed on the cap. Moreover that would have put them in a major pickle for next year. Instead they used their leverage to get him to sign an extremely team friendly 2 year deal. And all of this played out after they re-signed Lindell, a much less important piece to a two year $5.2M deal that put extra pressure on Dallas to get Harley signed for a second year at a very low number.

Toronto dealt with Robertson in pretty much exactly the same way the Oilers dealt with Holloway. If say Chicago had offered him even $1.2M they probably would have just let him walk because it would have meant additional restrictions on the roster.

Dallas prospectively had a 2 player RFA offer sheet threat but dealt Ty Dellandrea in mid-June. They shaved salary and with a strong draft development function had internal replacements available. Harley's comparables were also Bouchard and Dobson which is where he signed. So a range of comparables are out there. An $8.5 million offer sheet requires compensation of 2 1sts, 2nd round and 3rd round picks. It is a substantial investment of draft capital and with established NHL players, we see the tendency is for team's to vigorously match them historical. Shea Weber the extreme. So ... theoretically... Utah could have offer sheeted a division rival. So could have any team with that significant draft collateral. But the juice isn't worth the squeeze.

Harley was developed well, had no beef with his team, and determined his future was clear and set in Dallas. Oilers had a double offer sheet threat with a guy who had made an in-season trade demand and a raw power forward type who showed well in deep playoff competition.

https://x.com/i/web/status/1836204689190207963

In theory .... Robertson and every RFA player is a threat to be offer sheeted. Reality is different, he's a middle roster player with holes in his game and plays a position with strong and cheap supply options. He didn't have an RFA wingman with compelling raw potential at a more difficult position and harder to find/acquire only entering prime performance years. There's no where to go and Chicago or other teams can easily find cheap alternatives. Or as likely to happen trade for a cost controlled question mark.

Edmonton's situation was different/unique. Double threat of talent exposure, disgruntled player history with a trade request, cap stretched with 3 cornerstone players to sign in future years, strong potential but largely unproven, public noise by one NHL GM in June that offer sheets could be on the table. And of course as a window team the Oilers aren't going to deviate from their signing priorities. But doesn't preclude them from forcing the issue early to fish or cut bait on their own internal supply. Find out if the players are signable, test the trade market to cover off options, and manage the process. They moved on McLeod and returned cap saving and a quality prospect. Unfortunately the old model didn't work to passively smoke out two RFA players.

 

[CupofOil]

Both players made decisions to secure their financial future and with opportunities that align with their age and development. Trust me I hope both crash and burn. But I can understand their decision which overwhelmingly most people would do in their situation.

The Oilers chose to handle their high risk situation differently than Dallas, Boston and other non-elite teams with quality RFA's this summer (they all kept cap space). Unfortunately it didn't work out the way I, you, or most importantly, Oilers management expected.

But why would the Oilers keep cap space, ignore pressing needs during free agency, at the oft chance that Broberg and Holloway get offer sheeted so they could then choose to match those offer sheets and overpay them while also killing cap flexibility? That doesn't make sense tbh.

The bottom line is that RFAs always get squeezed, this isn't lowballing it's the market as you see with these other RFA's coming in at low numbers, so what Oilers management did is what most management teams do. They use their leverage (no arb rights) to get a team friendly deal then worry about the big contract later if they progress. This is standard procedure unless it's a franchise level RFA that get the big contracts right out of the ELC like the Montreal guys this offseason for instance.

I actually commend management for making the best out of an impossible situation.
Traded a low pick for a cost controlled Podkolzin, traded the Ceci contract for Emberson getting a possible suitable replacement and saving cap space so that now they can accrue cap space going into the deadline and make a splash in a win now window. Then they were able to leverage the threat of an offer sheet match by getting Fischer who seems like a worthwhile prospect and a mid round pick.
They did about as well as can be expected considering the hand they were dealt, not only did well but did more than I thought possible in that tight window to accumulate some assets, add useful players and create cap space.

 

[GhostfaceWu]

He is probably the best one on that team.
We extremely overrate Ekholm here in Edmonton too even when he is just an above avg Dman

Absolute nonsense but you always tend to have the most outlandish opinions.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

But why would the Oilers keep cap space, ignore pressing needs during free agency, at the oft chance that Broberg and Holloway get offer sheeted so they could then choose to match those offer sheets and overpay them while also killing cap flexibility? That doesn't make sense tbh.

The bottom line is that RFAs always get squeezed, this isn't lowballing it's the market as you see with these other RFA's coming in at low numbers, so what Oilers management did is what most management teams do. They use their leverage (no arb rights) to get a team friendly deal then worry about the big contract later if they progress. This is standard procedure unless it's a franchise level RFA that get the big contracts right out of the ELC like the Montreal guys this offseason for instance.

I actually commend management for making the best out of an impossible situation.
Traded a low pick for a cost controlled Podkolzin, traded the Ceci contract for Emberson getting a possible suitable replacement and saving cap space so that now they can accrue cap space going into the deadline and make a splash in a win now window.
They did about as well as can be expected considering the hand they were dealt.

I'm pointing out how other teams managed their RFA's. All kept money available even Dallas and Boston in similar window phase. The Oilers obviously didn't have that luxury. What they had was an opportunity to decide quicker and definitely if their team control players, notably a guy who asked for a trade request, could be re-signed. Engage early in negotiation, have a clear financial threshold budget line in the sand, and if you can't resolve explore the trade route. Make a hard decision faster. It quite possible gets Holloway done within team reasonable budget threshold and clarity on the guy who made a trade request. Then your risk is down to one player.

The McLeod trade is a great example. Trade a player who doesn't fit on roster or in budget for a future prospect to replenish a poor prospect pool. The Oilers allegedly had one or two year trade deadline discussions involving external team interest in Broberg and Holloway. That's a quick, efficient starting point ... not coincidentally including the guy that imposed a new market value on both players. Coming off solid support performance of a deep Cup run there's recency observation on player potential backed by in Broberg's case a strong AHL reset season. There's already a sense of trade value for the players established. And at least in St. Louis's case a strong prospect pool to consider a future for present trade.

Move quicker to negotiate, know your hard line in the sand, if not there, then explore or even concurrently explore the trade market.

 

[Mcnotloilersfan]

He is probably the best one on that team.
We extremely overrate Ekholm here in Edmonton too even when he is just an above avg Dman

Come on... NHL network had him ranked as the 18th best dman in the league.

 

[K1984]

I'm pointing out how other teams managed their RFA's. All kept money available even Dallas and Boston in similar window phase. The Oilers obviously didn't have that luxury. What they had was an opportunity to decide quicker and definitely if their team control players, notably a guy who asked for a trade request, could be re-signed. Engage early in negotiation, have a clear financial threshold budget line in the sand, and if you can't resolve explore the trade route. Make a hard decision faster. It quite possible gets Holloway done within team reasonable budget threshold and clarity on the guy who made a trade request. Then your risk is down to one player.

The McLeod trade is a great example. Trade a player who doesn't fit on roster or in budget for a future prospect to replenish a poor prospect pool. The Oilers allegedly had one or two year trade deadline discussions involving external team interest in Broberg and Holloway. That's a quick, efficient starting point ... not coincidentally including the guy that imposed a new market value on both players. Coming off solid support performance of a deep Cup run there's recency observation on player potential backed by in Broberg's case a strong AHL reset season. There's already a sense of trade value for the players established. And at least in St. Louis's case a strong prospect pool to consider a future for present trade.

Move quicker to negotiate, know your hard line in the sand, if not there, then explore or even concurrently explore the trade market.

Three problems with this:

1 - why are the Blues trading anything more than they had to give up in the offer sheet?

2 - I don't think their trade value was much more than what we got in offer sheets anyways. Even if we got prospects instead of picks, those players are probably 2nd/3rd round quality anyways.

3 - Why would any other team deal assets that exceed the value outlined in point 1 or 2 if they know that these players aren't coming as cheap as they should?

 

[GreeningOil]

I can't believe how effective he was on the ice with a midsection seemingly held together by tape, bandages and hope lol

Right? Playing at the highest level with those injuries is crazy.

It gives me hope that if he pulls through this surgery and recovery that he’s going to be one of those guys who stay effective as they get closer to 40.

 

[Mcnotloilersfan]

Three problems with this:

1 - why are the Blues trading anything more than they had to give up in the offer sheet?

2 - I don't think their trade value was much more than what we got in offer sheets anyways. Even if we got prospects instead of picks, those players are probably 2nd/3rd round quality anyways.

3 - Why would any other team deal assets that exceed the value outlined in point 1 or 2 if they know that these players aren't coming as cheap as they should?

I think simply with Edmonton playing the situation as best they could once the offer sheets were made. They made the Ceci deal. Made it clear we COULD match, put Kane on LTIR and figure the rest out later. It gave us some leverage to squeeze a little more.

 

[GreeningOil]

Imagine being an Alberta boy and going from a Cup contending team with arguably the best fans in hockey, the nicest rink and training facilities in hockey, an owner that loves to spend money on the team, with a chance to play on McDrai's wing in a city you're used to then going to a team that might not make the playoffs for a few years in one of the highest crime rate cities in the NHL with a fan base that puts hockey behind the WNBA.

That's the face you make when it's photo day in your new jersey.

Well…

Regardless of that, he laid his own bed. Hopefully he doesn’t cry when him and Broberg get bood hard when they come to Edmonton!

 

[Mcnotloilersfan]

Oilers sign Jasper Weatherby to a PTO. Who...?

 

[K1984]

Oilers sign Jasper Weatherby to a PTO. Who...?

This guy probably has the most games played in the NHL for someone that I have never heard of whatsoever.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

Three problems with this:

1 - why are the Blues trading anything more than they had to give up in the offer sheet?

2 - I don't think their trade value was much more than what we got in offer sheets anyways. Even if we got prospects instead of picks, those players are probably 2nd/3rd round quality anyways.

3 - Why would any other team deal assets that exceed the value outlined in point 1 or 2 if they know that these players aren't coming as cheap as they should?

The Blues did not own their required 2nd round pick until August 13. It was a formative idea until that date with no ability to formalize an offer they couldn't deliver upon without the pick.

A trade negotiation mitigates inflationary practice requiring overpay to acquire. The Blues prospect pool is pretty deep with viable quality options at forward. By one Prospect Pool ranking Fischer is their 8th ranked guy. 2024-25 NHL Prospect Pool Breakdown: St. Louis Blues’ Top 10.

That's only 1 team and GM's are able to explore the league. We don't know what other teams they discussed Broberg and Holloway with. But NHL ready talent coming off league viewings of performance at highest degree of competition, it's reasonable to think there would be interest in latent potential entering prime year performance, specifically Broberg.

Teams all share a desire to effectively work with the Cap system. Trades are favourable situations that deliver a win win scenario and don't create inflationary considerations that prospectively impact all teams. An offer sheet scenario is always the extreme situation. A trade to a favourable fresh start team can still happen and a reasonable contract negotiated that doesn't half to default to highest inflationary level required to go the offer sheet route. Broberg's trade request was ultimately about opportunity and fresh start. Per above, Armstrong didn't have the required pick until August 13.

 

[PositiveCashFlow]

Oilers sign Jasper Weatherby to a PTO. Who...?

Someone to fill the veteran quota for the split squad game maybe?

 

[Fourier]

Dallas prospectively had a 2 player RFA offer sheet threat but dealt Ty Dellandrea in mid-June. They shaved salary and with a strong draft development function had internal replacements available. Harley's comparables were also Bouchard and Dobson which is where he signed. So a range of comparables are out there. An $8.5 million offer sheet requires compensation of 2 1sts, 2nd round and 3rd round picks. It is a substantial investment of draft capital and with established NHL players, we see the tendency is for team's to vigorously match them historical. Shea Weber the extreme. So ... theoretically... Utah could have offer sheeted a division rival. So could have any team with that significant draft collateral. But the juice isn't worth the squeeze.

Harley was developed well, had no beef with his team, and determined his future was clear and set in Dallas. Oilers had a double offer sheet threat with a guy who had made an in-season trade demand and a raw power forward type who showed well in deep playoff competition.

https://x.com/i/web/status/1836204689190207963

In theory .... Robertson and every RFA player is a threat to be offer sheeted. Reality is different, he's a middle roster player with holes in his game and plays a position with strong and cheap supply options. He didn't have an RFA wingman with compelling raw potential at a more difficult position and harder to find/acquire only entering prime performance years. There's no where to go and Chicago or other teams can easily find cheap alternatives. Or as likely to happen trade for a cost controlled question mark.

Edmonton's situation was different/unique. Double threat of talent exposure, disgruntled player history with a trade request, cap stretched with 3 cornerstone players to sign in future years, strong potential but largely unproven, public noise by one NHL GM in June that offer sheets could be on the table. And of course as a window team the Oilers aren't going to deviate from their signing priorities. But doesn't preclude them from forcing the issue early to fish or cut bait on their own internal supply. Find out if the players are signable, test the trade market to cover off options, and manage the process. They moved on McLeod and returned cap saving and a quality prospect. Unfortunately the old model didn't work to passively smoke out two RFA players.

Brock Faber is at $8.5M per year. That is the deal that he could have easily used had he wanted to push the team via an OS. And the compensation for an $9.1M contract is a 1st, 2nd and a 3rd. Frankly, if Dallas put him on the market they could easily have gotten that. Moreover, if I am Utah with cap space and draft choices coming out of my ears for years to come a $9.1M offer to get Harley is a far safer bet than $4.6M even with the difference in compensation. He's already playing as a legitimate top pairing defenseman. Broberg is actually older than Harley, and has never fully established himself at the NHL level.

If Utah makes that offer and Dallas matches, Dallas not only has to shed about $5M in cap space, weakening a key division rival, but also puts them in an massive pickle next year when they have to re-sign Johnston Bourque and Ottenger. Matching that OS would have damaged the Stars far more than losing Broberg and Holloway did for the Oilers. But they didn't do anything to make sure they could protect against what would have been a devastating OS and instead held tough and git him to sign at a $600K discount to what Broberg got.

Of course the main difference is that Harley wanted to be a star more than Broberg wanted to be an Oiler. But from a team perspective both teams operated in a manner consistent with using their cap space in such a way as to maximize their chances of winning over the next two years.

Again, Edmonton's situation has been far far from unique. The key here was that you had a very rare combination of a GM with a lot of cap space who coveted a particular player to a level that would merit a rather ridiculous overpay and a player that had a foot out the door who was willing to leave a serious contender for a team that may not even be a solid playoff favorite in the next few years. The closest we have seen to this situation was Carolina's predatory offer to JK which frankly Montreal had far more reason to believe was coming. Like KK, the Oilers simply did not see Broberg as being worth the investment because they could have matched had they want to.

Normally when I get into an ongoing debate with someone as rational and knowledgeable as you I find some convergence in positions. This is a rare exception. Honestly, the more we discuss this the more convinced I am that the Oilers managed this appropriately. Even if in June Armstrong came out and said, we intend to send a serious OS to both these guys, I really don't think the final outcome would have been all that different for this team going into a new season. There have been lots of blunders in strategy and otherwise, but for me this is not one of them.

 

[SupremeTeam16]

I absolutely agree with the bolded statement. In fact for a team contending for a cup its is not even 2 times. The first second and third priority has to be building the best team for the next two years. You need to pay these guys commensurate with their role. Otherwise, you risk cap consequences that would weaken your team more than the loss of these players.

This is exactly why for the most part GM’s stay away from offer sheets and never for players as unestablished as these two. I don’t care what Armstrong says, there absolutely is an unwritten understanding amongst GM’s because they know these types of tactics are inflationary and could contribute to shrinking competitive windows. In isolation it wouldn’t matter but if GM’s start breaking ranks as Armstrong has then it tips the scales in favour of player agents during negotiations for this player group and it adds a ton of risk for general managers who have to overpay unproven players or risk losing half developed players they’ve already spent time and resources developing.

 

[Jimmi McJenkins]

Oilers sign Jasper Weatherby to a PTO. Who...?

He played 50 games with the Sharks in 21/22, had 5g and 11pts. He's a former 4th rounder from the Sharks, was under contract with the Preds last year, he's an AHL depth guy. Help fill out camp.

 

[TopShelfGloveSide]

He is probably the best one on that team.
We extremely overrate Ekholm here in Edmonton too even when he is just an above avg Dman

embarrassing

 

[CupofOil]

I'm pointing out how other teams managed their RFA's. All kept money available even Dallas and Boston in similar window phase. The Oilers obviously didn't have that luxury. What they had was an opportunity to decide quicker and definitely if their team control players, notably a guy who asked for a trade request, could be re-signed. Engage early in negotiation, have a clear financial threshold budget line in the sand, and if you can't resolve explore the trade route. Make a hard decision faster. It quite possible gets Holloway done within team reasonable budget threshold and clarity on the guy who made a trade request. Then your risk is down to one player.

The McLeod trade is a great example. Trade a player who doesn't fit on roster or in budget for a future prospect to replenish a poor prospect pool. The Oilers allegedly had one or two year trade deadline discussions involving external team interest in Broberg and Holloway. That's a quick, efficient starting point ... not coincidentally including the guy that imposed a new market value on both players. Coming off solid support performance of a deep Cup run there's recency observation on player potential backed by in Broberg's case a strong AHL reset season. There's already a sense of trade value for the players established. And at least in St. Louis's case a strong prospect pool to consider a future for present trade.

Move quicker to negotiate, know your hard line in the sand, if not there, then explore or even concurrently explore the trade market.

The problem with the trade route is, what exactly is their value?
Surely other teams could also sense the offer sheet possibility so what they'd be trading for is two guys who are unproven 4-5 years into their post-draft careers with the looming threat of an offer sheet so are the Oilers getting much more than the 2nd+3rd that they were awarded for OS compensation? I'm not so sure. I think there's a reason why those trade discussions were going nowhere, because the Oilers were likely getting lowballed for two players that hadn't proven anything at the NHL level at that point and were getting to the age where it's "show me" time.

The difference with McLeod and why he likely had more value is because he's a proven young 3rd liner with a distinct NHL proven skillset with his blazing speed and puck carrying ability so that was probably attractive for a team like Buffalo that wants to start winning games and had a need for speed on their 3rd line so the Oilers pounced on a team that had a surplus of skilled forward prospects and maximized value. I'm not sure that two fairly late bloomers that hadn't done much of anything at the NHL level in Broberg and Holloway would have carried the same value.

We could speculate all we want, and that's all this is, but the bottom line the fact of the matter based on a long history of such a thing is that RFA's get squeezed all the time and offer sheets rarely happen so who saw this coming? You can plan all these contingencies all you want but you can't force a player to sign (and as you see, most of these RFA's including your McLeod example, sign later in the summer) and you can't possibly assume that an offer sheet is going to be made when they so rarely happen in the league.
There's nothing Oilers management could have done and as I mentioned previously they made some real chicken salad out of a chicken shit situation.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

Brock Faber is at $8.5M per year. That is the deal that he could have easily used had he wanted to push the team via an OS. And the compensation for an $9.1M contract is a 1st, 2nd and a 3rd. Frankly, if Dallas put him on the market they could easily have gotten that. Moreover, if I am Utah with cap space coming out of years for years to come a $9.1M offer to get Harley is a far safer bet than $4.6M even with the difference in compensation. He's already playing as a legitimate top pairing defenseman. Broberg is actually older than Harley, and has never fully established himself at the NHL level.

If Utah makes that offer and Dallas matches, Dallas not only has to shed about $5M in cap space, weakening a key division rival, but also puts them in an massive pickle next year when they have to re-sign Johnston Bourque and Ottenger. Matching that OS would have damaged the Stars far more than losing Broberg and Holloway did for the Oilers. But they didn't do anything to make sure they could protect against what would have been a devastating OS and instead held tough and git him to sign at a $600K discount to what Broberg got.

Of course the main difference is that Harley wanted to be a star more than Broberg wanted to be an Oiler. But from a team perspective both teams operated in a manner consistent with using their cap space in such a way as to maximize their chances of winning over the next two years.

Again, Edmonton's situation has been far far from unique. The key here was that you had a very rare combination of a GM with a lot of cap space who coveted a particular player to a level that would merit a rather ridiculous overpay and a player that had a foot out the door who was willing to leave a serious contender for a team that may not even be a solid playoff favorite in the next few years. The closest we have seen to this situation was Carolina's predatory offer to JK which frankly Montreal had far more reason to believe was coming. Like KK, the Oilers simply did not see Broberg as being worth the investment because they could have matched had they want to.

Honestly, the more we discuss this the more convinced I am that the Oilers managed this appropriately. Even if in June Armstrong came out and said, we intend to send a serious OS to both these guys, I don't think the final outcome would have been all that different for this team going into a new season. There have been lots of blunders in strategy and otherwise, but for me this is not one of them.

The operate consideration is bolded. Their organizational situations were fundamentally different. And there's always contract outliers like Faber but a great example of a team prioritizing its in-house talent and pro-actively locking it up. The contrast with Harley situation is that he accepted a deal that aligns with the majority of his peers, notably Bouchard and Dobson. He was developed well by a strong organization and his path clear in his deployment. Unfortunately the Oilers had two players at risk and reporting suggests both didn't see a clear opportunity path with their team which is chasing a Cup.

The similarity with an analytics driven organization Carolina is that the players involved were at premiums positions, centre and defense, and a viable age with clear developmental upside. The only way to get such players through offer sheeting is to make a reach offer that has to be weighed against cap cost, belief or not that latent potential can be realized, available roster spot, etc. Fact is that the KK offer sheet required a 1st round pick +. Flight risk Broberg and Holloway were gambled at pushing a lesser compensation level.

We're both in hypothetical land. There was a viable choice to act quicker and assertively to determine the signability or not of Broberg and Holloway. They had been trade discussion pieces previously and a value set with Bushnevich and some level of retention (possibly as high as 50%). There was a runway of exclusive negotiation window until July 1. An open market window until August 13 when the market assigned a new value. The old model worked until it didn't work with $5 million more dollars in the system, a player at a coveted position and stage of development, and a second risk option. The key consideration is a player who asked for a trade request.

Again, we land at a different opinion based upon hypotheticals. It's okay and I get the frustration of a repeating argument.

 

[Cloned]

The operate consideration is bolded. Their organizational situations were fundamentally different. And there's always contract outliers like Faber but a great example of a team prioritizing its in-house talent and pro-actively locking it up. The contrast with Harley situation is that he accepted a deal that aligns with the majority of his peers, notably Bouchard and Dobson. He was developed well by a strong organization and his path clear in his deployment. Unfortunately the Oilers had two players at risk and reporting suggests both didn't see a clear opportunity path with their team which is chasing a Cup.

The similarity with an analytics driven organization Carolina is that the players involved were at premiums positions, centre and defense, and a viable age with clear developmental upside. The only way to get such players through offer sheeting is to make a reach offer that has to be weighed against cap cost, belief or not that latent potential can be realized, available roster spot, etc. Fact is that the KK offer sheet required a 1st round pick +. Flight risk Broberg and Holloway were gambled at pushing a lesser compensation level.

We're both in hypothetical land. There was a viable choice to act quicker and assertively to determine the signability or not of Broberg and Holloway. They had been trade discussion pieces previously and a value set with Bushnevich and some level of retention (possibly as high as 50%). There was a runway of exclusive negotiation window until July 1. An open market window until August 13 when the market assigned a new value. The old model worked until it didn't work with $5 million more dollars in the system, a player at a coveted position and stage of development, and a second risk option. The key consideration is a player who asked for a trade request.

Again, we land at a different opinion based upon hypotheticals. It's okay and I get the frustration of a repeating argument.

What exactly did you expect the Oilers to do here that would’ve been “correct?”

From the sounds of it, Broberg was looking for any avenue to leave the team and even if the Oilers had 20M in cap space and offered him the same contract the Blues did I think he still chooses the Blues.

These are bad contracts the Blues signed and the Oilers were smart not to match or offer the same amount to these players before the OS.

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

The problem with the trade route is, what exactly is their value?
Surely other teams could also sense the offer sheet possibility so what they'd be trading for is two guys who are unproven 4-5 years into their post-draft careers with the looming threat of an offer sheet so are the Oilers getting much more than the 2nd+3rd that they were awarded for OS compensation? I'm not so sure. I think there's a reason why those trade discussions were going nowhere, because the Oilers were likely getting lowballed for two players that hadn't proven anything at the NHL level at that point and were getting to the age where it's "show me" time.

The difference with McLeod and why he likely had more value is because he's a proven young 3rd liner with a distinct NHL proven skillset with his blazing speed and puck carrying ability so that was probably attractive for a team like Buffalo that wants to start winning games and had a need for speed on their 3rd line so the Oilers pounced on a team that had a surplus of skilled forward prospects and maximized value. I'm not sure that two fairly late bloomers that hadn't done much of anything at the NHL level in Broberg and Holloway would have carried the same value.

We could speculate all we want, and that's all this is, but the bottom line the fact of the matter based on a long history of such a thing is that RFA's get squeezed all the time and offer sheets rarely happen so who saw this coming? You can plan all these contingencies all you want but you can't force a player to sign (and as you see, most of these RFA's including your McLeod example, sign later in the summer) and you can't possibly assume that an offer sheet is going to be made when they so rarely happen in the league.
There's nothing Oilers management could have done and as I mentioned previously they made some real chicken salad out of a chicken shit situation.

Covered elsewhere and repeatedly.

One benchmark for trade value was Broberg and Holloway for Bushnevich and some level of retention (possibly up to 50%). The trade value goal is a high level system prospect closer to NHL ready than the value of unknown (picks).

I venture that everyone was surprised that McLeod net a recent top 10 pedigree, near NHL ready return. It affirms that we don't know what trade value is and is different pending organization's needs, market pressures to improve, phase of organization, risk tolerance to move future hopes for NHL ready talent. The McLeod signing was first week of August. Had the Oilers even reached that signing date with one of the two players the offer sheet risk is halved.

We're all speculating here whether about prospective trade options, viability of other RFA targets, and falling back to an old model of how RFA's usually happen. The Oilers situation had many high risk factors, a trade request player, cap overage, big cornerstone contracts upcoming.

I think their management has had adequate response when forced by the market to move on from their NHL ready drafted and development talent. Unfortunately 2RD is a big question mark and the 94% PK is down all its RD options from last year. I feel there was a viable different path with all available information and risk factors to move early and assertively on their double indemnity at risk draft developed talent.

 

[Canovin]

Anyone know where we can find another overrated Ekholm for cheap? Asking for a friend

 

[Behind Enemy Lines]

What exactly did you expect the Oilers to do here that would’ve been “correct?”

From the sounds of it, Broberg was looking for any avenue to leave the team and even if the Oilers had 20M in cap space and offered him the same contract the Blues did I think he still chooses the Blues.

These are bad contracts the Blues signed and the Oilers were smart not to match or offer the same amount to these players before the OS.

Negotiate early and aggressively within your fixed budget evaluation of both players. Explore trade options to understand the available options. Reports were plentiful of a Broberg Holloway Blues connection with a high skill top forward Bushnevich + retention (possibly as high as 50%) as the return. Start there and broaden the trade discussions to understand your options.

Clear Broberg is a flight risk so get clarity quickly on re-signing likelihood or not within your budget versus what market price could be in circumstances beyond your control.

The Blues downside is low risk. Secondary picks and a mid-range prospect when the Oilers bluffed with the Ceci trade. They can walk away from both players after one year with 1/3 buy-outs. Now if one or both hits, they have a cheap acquisition of a top 4 d-man to work with Parayko or Faulk. Holloway my prediction is he is a Calgary Flamer within three years.

The contracts were poison pills for Edmonton that worked. For St. Louis they are reasonable risks with marginal assets given up and cheap walkaway if their pro scout evaluations are wrong on two young players only entering prime years performance range.

My first post after the offer sheets tabled was Broberg gone maybe Holloway retained. I disagree with the passive approach with a player who wanted a trade only months ago.