Hippasus
1,9,45,165,495,1287,
In order to refute the notion of a private language argument, I would like to adduce the following argument from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Let us suppose towards contradiction that a name or expression may designate a private object or notion. Every individual may or may not have a criterion of correctness, based on a certain string of symbols and the personal experience to which may or may not ascribe.
Case I: The symbols accurately describe a particular experience or intended use of a given term. Again, towards contradiction suppose one, perhaps whilst stranded on a desert island, attempts to devise a private language, perhaps in a locked-up diary. In order for there to be a veritable language, we require a publicity of sense, which entails the possibility, or alternatively, the incorrectness of the usage of a given term or expression. We require some sort of criterion of correctness of the usage of a given term or expression.
Say, I have a beetle in a box, and this is part of my private language. I see a 'beetle' and it is in my 'box'. What might some other private language user ascribe towards the correctness of such an assertion? Perhaps a 'beetle' designates some sort of ever-changing object, perhaps a 'beetle' designates the absence of an object. If one cannot, in a given private language, designate some rule(s) of rectitude in terms of the usage of some expression or designation of a private experience, one cannot consider one's discourse to be considered part of a language. It might as well be a cacophony of meaningless strings of symbols, or linguistic utterances.
Case II: The symbols falsely describe a particular experience of a particular term. This case supports the thesis of the impossibility of a private language.
So Descartes or one of his expositors said, "I think, therefore I am." What room is there left for private or subjective experience in a public or potentially objective discourse? I say, none, for the reasons given.
This argument might even be extended towards expounding the impossibility of a veritably sentient artificial intelligence, but that might be a story for a different day.
Case I: The symbols accurately describe a particular experience or intended use of a given term. Again, towards contradiction suppose one, perhaps whilst stranded on a desert island, attempts to devise a private language, perhaps in a locked-up diary. In order for there to be a veritable language, we require a publicity of sense, which entails the possibility, or alternatively, the incorrectness of the usage of a given term or expression. We require some sort of criterion of correctness of the usage of a given term or expression.
Say, I have a beetle in a box, and this is part of my private language. I see a 'beetle' and it is in my 'box'. What might some other private language user ascribe towards the correctness of such an assertion? Perhaps a 'beetle' designates some sort of ever-changing object, perhaps a 'beetle' designates the absence of an object. If one cannot, in a given private language, designate some rule(s) of rectitude in terms of the usage of some expression or designation of a private experience, one cannot consider one's discourse to be considered part of a language. It might as well be a cacophony of meaningless strings of symbols, or linguistic utterances.
Case II: The symbols falsely describe a particular experience of a particular term. This case supports the thesis of the impossibility of a private language.
So Descartes or one of his expositors said, "I think, therefore I am." What room is there left for private or subjective experience in a public or potentially objective discourse? I say, none, for the reasons given.
This argument might even be extended towards expounding the impossibility of a veritably sentient artificial intelligence, but that might be a story for a different day.
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